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Abstract 
This paper employs the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a model to 
understand the legislative process that led to the implementation of plea 
bargaining as an anticorruption tool in Brazil. Through the analysis of primary 
qualitative data, it assesses the political and social forces that formed a coalition 
and propelled this legislative process forward, thus allowing the posterior 
emergence of the largest anticorruption judicial action in the history of Brazil. 
In doing so, it elucidates the reasons that led a systemically corrupt legislative 
to enact a remarkably effective anticorruption policy, often to the detriment of 
lawmakers themselves. This paper’s contribution to the literature about the 
anticorruption framework in Brazil lies in its critical interpretation of the 
interplay of political forces involved in the early stages of policy formulation. It 
adds empirical elements to a modern institutional approach to the study of 
corruption, which derives from classical theories about the formation of 
Brazilian society. Finally, the paper serves as an illustration of the difficulties 
inherent to applying the ACF in dysfunctional contexts, such as those marked 
by systemic corruption. 
Keywords 
Plea bargaining, corruption, Lava Jato, Advocacy Coalition Framework. 
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Acronyms 
 
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework 
ADPF Associação dos Delegados de Polícia Federal  
(National Association of Federal Police Commissioners) 
AGU Advocacia-Geral da União 
(Federal Legal Department) 
AMARRIBO Amigos Associados de Ribeirão Bonito  
(Associated Friends of Ribeirão Bonito) 
Banestado Banco do Estado do Paraná 
(Paraná State Bank) 
CCJ Comissão de Constituição e Justiça  
(Congress’ Commission for Constitution and Justice) 
CEP Comissão de Ética Pública  
(Public Ethics Commission) 
CGU Controladoria-Geral da União  
(General Comptroller’s Office, recently renamed Ministry of 
Transparency, Oversight and General Comptroller’s Office) 
CNJ Conselho Nacional de Justiça  
(National Justice Council) 
CNMP Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público  
(Prosecutor’s Office National Council) 
Coaf/MF Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras do Ministério 
da Fazenda  
(Council for Financial Activities Control of the Ministry of 
Finance) 
COL Criminal Organizations Law (Law 12.850/13) 
CONAMP Associação Nacional dos Membros do Ministério Público 
(National Association of Federal Prosecutors) 
CPI Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito 
(Parliamentary Inquiry Commission) 
DRCI/MJ Departamento de Recuperação de Ativos e Cooperação 
Jurídica Internacional do Ministério da Jutiça  
(Department of Asset Recovery and International Legal 
Cooperation of the Ministry of Justice) 
ENCCLA Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção e Lavagem de 
Dinheiro  
(National Strategy for Fighting Corruption and Money 
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Laundering) 
FATF Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
 
MP Ministério Público  
(Prosecutor’s Office) 
MPF Ministério Público Federal  
(Federal Prosecutor’s Office) 
OAB Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil  
(Brazilian Bar Association) 
PDT Partido Democrático Trabalhista  
(Democratic Labour Party) 
PF Polícia Federal  
(Federal Police) 
PLS Projeto de Lei do Senado  
(Bill from the Senate) 
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira  
(Brazilian Social Democratic Party) 
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores  
(Worker’s Party) 
SAL Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos do Ministério da Justiça 
(Secretariat of Legislative Affairs of the Ministry of Justice) 
STF Supremo Tribunal Federal  
(Supreme Court) 
TCU Tribunal de Contas da União  
(Federal Accounts Tribunal) 
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Glossary 
 
Plea bargaining: the expression used in the COL is colaboração premiada, which 
literally translates as ‘awarded collaboration’. This technique has become 
popularly known in Brazil as delação premiada, or ‘awarded denunciation’. 
Although for the sake of clarity we have opted to refer to this instrument as 
‘plea bargaining’, it has significant differences from the tool used in the 
American criminal justice system. Whereas in the US defendants are allowed, 
for instance, to plead guilty to a lesser offense (a bargain whose benefit to the 
prosecution is merely the avoidance of a costly and time-consuming trial), in 
Brazil plea bargains serve exclusively to obtain one of the following results: 1) 
identifying other criminals; 2) revealing the structure of the criminal 
organization; 3) preventing other crimes by the organization; 4) recovering 
assets accrued through the criminal activity; or 5) locating a victim of the crime 
in safety (COL, article 4). 
 
Criminal organizations: Article 1, paragraph 1 of the COL defines criminal 
organizations as follows: “the association of four or more persons in a 
structurally ordered way and with division of labour, even if informal, with the 
objective of obtaining, directly or indirectly, advantages of any nature through 
the practice of criminal infractions whose maximum sentences are higher than 
four years, or that are transnational in nature.” Therefore, the law does not 
specify which type of criminal infraction leads to the additional charges of 
belonging to a criminal organization. 
 
Preventive arrests: this type of arrest can be ordered by judges at any point of 
the investigation or of the criminal trial. According to article 312 of the 
criminal procedure code, its purpose is to “ensure the public or economic 
order; to safeguard the judicial proceedings; or to ensure the application of 
criminal law”. In other words, preventive arrests should be used to stop the 
defendant from continuing to practice the crime, or to prevent them from 
disrupting the investigation by escaping, destroying evidence, threatening 
witnesses, etc. Since these arrests are ordered before the trial, they do not have 
a punitive nature. Accordingly, STF jurisprudence states that they “cannot be 
used as an instrument of anticipated punishment (…), because in the Brazilian 
legal system, which is founded upon democratic bases, the principle of liberty 
prevails, being incompatible to punishment without due process and 
irreconcilable with convictions without prior defence (…). The gravity in 
abstract of the crime does not legitimize the preventive deprivation of liberty” 
(Habeas Corpus 96095, 2009). 
 
Parliamentary Inquiry Commissions (CPIs): these are temporary 
investigative bodies formed by either house of Congress, or by both together. 
According to the 1988 Constitution, they “have investigative powers typical of 
judicial authorities, besides the powers assigned by the regiments of each 
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house” (CF 88, Article 58, Paragraph 3). These powers include the issuing of 
subpoenas, the request for disclosure of financial information protected by 
privacy laws, etc. They are usually set up to investigate well-determined facts 
that have attracted public attention (such as the deterioration in public safety, 
in the case of the Public Safety CPI of 2002). Its conclusions can be submitted 
to the MP, which then decides whether its findings should lead to the 
prosecution, whether civil or criminal, of the suspects. 
 
Meta-individual rights: In Brazilian law, meta-individual rights are those 
possessed by groups, classes or categories of individuals. According to Mazzilli 
(2005: 19), they can be: 1) diffuse, when they are indivisible and common to a 
group whose individuals cannot be determined, but who share a certain factual 
situation (e.g., the right to a protected environment); 2) collective, when they 
are indivisible, common to a group whose individuals can be determined, and 
who are united by the same legal relationship (e.g., those who enter into 
consumer contract that contains illegal clauses whose consequences are equally 
borne by all members of the group); and 3) homogenous individual interests 
(similar to those of class action lawsuits in the US), when they are divisible, 
common to a group whose individuals can be determined, and who have 
suffered damages from a common cause (e.g., buyers of a defective product).  
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The accidental Trojan horse  
Plea bargaining as an anticorruption tool in Brazil 
1 Introduction 
Why would corrupt lawmakers create, to their own detriment, an 
anticorruption tool so effective that it immediately brought about the biggest 
scandal in their country’s history? 
On May 2006, PLS 150 was presented as a bill in the Brazilian Senate. 
Seven years later, on August 2013, it entered into force as the Law 12.850, or 
‘Criminal Organizations Law’ (COL). Under this law, taking part in organized 
crime came to be considered an offense in itself, meaning, for instance, that a 
gang member who deals drugs can now be charged not only with the 
‘antecedent crime’ of drug trafficking, but also with the additional offense of 
belonging to a criminal organization. Since the nature of this antecedent crime 
was not specified, any offense can be considered one, provided it has a 
maximum sentence above four years, or occurs on an international scale (COL, 
article 1, paragraph 1). 
Despite the fact that the COL’s main intended innovation was to define 
criminal organizations, it was one of its subsidiary portions that ultimately rose 
to fame in Brazilian politics. As a way to modernize the investigation tools at 
the disposal of the Brazilian criminal justice system, this law regulated so-called 
‘special techniques of investigation’, among which is plea bargaining. Although 
it already existed in previous laws, plea bargaining was not frequently applied 
with success in Brazil, due to a lack of thorough procedural regulation. With 
the COL, prosecutors quickly began to resort to this instrument as a way of 
unearthing and proving crimes that were particularly secretive in nature. 
 
One such crime is corruption. 
 
Merely seven months after the COL came into force, on March 2014, the 
Federal Police (PF) and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) began to 
investigate four criminal organizations led by ‘doleiros’ (‘dollar-men’, foreign 
exchange brokers who deal in the parallel market). The investigations and 
ensuing prosecutions fell under the jurisdiction of a federal court in Curitiba, 
the capital of the southern state of Paraná, since the crimes had initiated in 
Londrina, a town in this state. The PF named this operation ‘Lava Jato’ 
(Carwash), because a petrol station in Brasília, the country’s capital, was being 
used for money laundering.  
The investigators identified the involvement of Alberto Yousseff, a doleiro, 
and Paulo Roberto da Costa, a former director of Brazil’s state-owned oil 
company, Petrobras. After being temporarily arrested, both Yousseff and 
Costa agreed to become informants, causing a chain of reactions that has 
resulted so far in 70 plea bargains and the revelation of a far-reaching and 
spectacularly large corruption scheme in Petrobras.  
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The Lava Jato uncovered kickbacks that were systematically paid by 
private companies to politicians, political parties and civil servants in exchange 
for contracts with Petrobras. The MPF is seeking to recover US$ 11.81 billion 
(including fines imposed against individuals and private companies). The 
criminal charges already filed refer to bribes amounting to US$ 1.98 billion. 
The operation has already led to the arrest of senior businesspeople in 
construction companies, as well as of prominent politicians. It has also led to 
the repatriation (mainly from bank accounts in Switzerland) of approximately 
US$ 230 million, with an additional US$ 750 million already frozen abroad and 
pending final sentences to be repatriated1. Not without reason, the PF 
considers this the largest investigation of corruption in the history of the 
country, dwarfing prior operations such as Satiagraha (2008) and Castelo de Areia 
(2009).  
Figure 1 
Repatriation into Brazil of funds illegally transferred abroad 
 
 
Source: Talento and DRCI (2016) [Updated until April 2016] 
 
 
The Lava Jato was also a significant factor in the impeachment of 
president Rousseff. Indeed, despite the fact that up to this moment she has not 
been personally implicated in the investigation and that her impeachment was 
1 All figures were updated until October 13th 2016. They were converted from 
Brazilian Reais using that date’s exchange rate (R$ 1 = US$ 0.31). Source: MPF 
(2016a). 
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based on an accounting technicality2, the damage to her popularity was clearly 
a factor that allowed political momentum for the process to go forward. 
As expected, however, critics of the operation have also been vocal. The 
backlash has hailed, predictably, from affected politicians, but also from other 
sources. Left-leaning sections of the media, for instance, have pointed to a bias 
against politicians from the PT, as opposed to those of the PSDB, as well as 
criticized the luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by informants3. Legal scholars have 
condemned the tendency to accept evidences obtained illicitly4. Lawyers such 
as Mariz (2016, personal interview) have highlighted that the misuse of 
preventive arrests to coerce defendants into signing plea bargains could lead to 
arbitrary arrests and to violations of constitutional rights, since Brazilian 
criminal law does not allow preventive arrests to be made with this purpose. 
Politicians have also made this last point, whether publicly (Deputy Wadih 
Damous proposed a bill – PL 4372/16 – prohibiting plea agreements to be 
made if the defendant was in prison) or privately (in a leaked phone 
conversation, the President of the Senate, Renan Calheiros, also suggested this 
measure (Valente 2016)). 
The most prominent criticism, however, came from members of the 
former PT government, who accused prosecutors of acting politically, with the 
goal of undermining the party, promoting the opposition and ultimately 
legitimising what the PT considers a coup d’état. The president of the PT, Rui 
Falcão, endorsed an open letter written by lawyers, saying that it “alerts about 
the excesses of forced plea bargains, of selective leaking of information to the 
press, of preventive arrests, of trials turned into spectacles, of restrictions to 
the right to a defence and to the work of lawyers” (Falcão 2016). When the 
former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was indicted by the Lava Jato, on 14 
September 2016, he responded by saying that “they have built a lie, and now 
2 President Rousseff was accused of ‘fiscal pedalling’, a ‘creative accounting’ technique 
that masks public deficit by delaying transfers from the central government to state 
banks, thus forcing these banks to front payments for social programmes such as the 
Bolsa Família. 
3 Fonseca (2015), for instance, argued that “some magistrates and prosecutors have 
failed to disguise their political passions, contributing to the hunt for Lula, the main 
target of the current operations.” Despite recognizing how disseminated corruption 
was within the PT, Santos (2015) claimed “each policy in favour of the poorest in the 
country increased the persecution to this new player [the PT].” Lastly, Beirangê (2016) 
contended that while informants “reside in beach-front mansions”, their testimonies 
have merely “served to bring about a partial and highly selective purge.” 
4 The issue of illicitly-obtained evidence has been much debated in Brazil. Convictions 
resulting from previous PF operations, such as Castelo de Areia, were annulled because 
they had been based on wiretappings undertaken without warrants. The Lava Jato 
itself faces accusations of gathering inadmissible evidence, since it intercepted 
conversations supposedly protected by attorney-client privilege (Lopes and Segalia 
2016). The Lava Jato taskforce has supported a legislative proposal allowing the use of 
illicit evidence, provided it is obtained with a ‘reasonable’ assumption of its legality 
(see chapter 6). 
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they will build the closing chapter, which is to end my political life” (Lula 
2016). 
Regardless of the view one adopts of the Lava Jato and of its political 
implications, it is impossible to understand its emergence without assessing the 
political forces that shape the anticorruption framework in Brazil. The usually 
slow-paced evolution of this complex system has suddenly been shaken by the 
introduction of plea bargaining, an instrument whose effectiveness has 
surprised the entire country. Thus, the process of formulation and 
implementation of such policy deserves scrutiny. 
So far, most analyses of plea bargaining in Brazil come from legal scholars, 
who focus on the technical aspects of its application during investigations and 
trials. Gomes and da Silva (2015) describe the shift from the previous model of 
‘conflictive’ criminal justice, whereby any negotiation between accuser and 
accused was prohibited, to a new model that allows such bargains as part of 
procedures. Pereira (2013) focuses on the value as evidence of the information 
obtained through plea bargains, concluding that it is incumbent on magistrates 
to argue convincingly that the declarations of the accused are credible, and that 
such opinion should be predicated upon “objective elements outside the scope 
of the declaration”, that is to say, that the information provided by the accused 
should be complemented with evidence from other sources in order for a 
conviction to be possible.  
In the field of public policy, on the other hand, a robust literature about 
this new instrument has yet to emerge in Brazil. Nevertheless, some legal 
scholars, replicating an already well-established international literature, have 
incipiently expanded their scope of inquiry to include analytical frameworks 
typical of social research, such as game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma, 
which attempt to explain how and why suspected criminals agree to become 
informants (Gomes 2015). 
However, no comprehensive account of the legislative process that led to 
the adoption of plea bargaining in Brazil has yet been made. This gap in the 
literature limits the understanding of how political gridlock can be overcome 
and consensus reached to implement effective tools to address the 
dysfunctionalities of the anticorruption framework. Such understanding would 
be a much welcomed complement to a well-established body of work that 
seeks to explain the overarching institutional traits of post-authoritarian Brazil, 
particularly with regards to the nefarious persistence of corruption as a scar on 
the country’s political system. 
This paper endeavours to present such an account, by building upon the 
literature that describes the cyclical nature of policy formulation and 
implementation, as well as provides a framework for assessing the advocacy 
coalitions formed within policy subsystems. 
In order to do so, we will first present and explain the research questions 
this work seeks to address. Then, we will describe the analytical framework and 
research methods employed to this end. Later, we will provide an overview of 
the literature that seeks to understand corruption as a systemic trait of Brazilian 
society, from traditional cultural approaches to modern models that describe 
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the country’s anticorruption framework. At this point, we will assess its 
institutional multiplicity and the several means of enforcement according to 
which it is organized, as well as the more robust role played by the MPF since 
the 1988 Constitution. We will then portray the political forces that shaped the 
legislative process leading to the approval of the COL and to the regulation of 
plea bargaining. Next, we will employ the analytical model of the advocacy 
coalition framework to understand these forces, first by applying its many 
elements to the coalitions formed in order to pass the COL, and later to 
understand the role of its two main beneficiaries, the judiciary (particularly with 
regards to the prominent role played by judge Sérgio Moro) and the 
prosecutor’s office. Finally, we will present our conclusions and suggest future 
directions for research. 
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2   Research questions 
2.1 Main research question 
Why have Brazilian lawmakers, who are widely perceived as corrupt, approved plea 
bargaining, seemingly against their own self-interest? 
With this central question, we seek to explain an apparent contradiction. On 
the one hand, a procedural instrument is implemented and quickly allows the 
systemic nature of corruption in Brazil to be revealed, many of its beneficiaries 
to be named and their participation in specific cases to be proven. On the 
other hand, the legislators responsible for creating this instrument are 
themselves seen as predominantly corrupt; thus, they had good reason to 
prevent plea bargaining from being approved, as evidenced by the fact that 
many of them were themselves ultimately implicated in the Lava Jato scandal.  
The claims that lawmakers are widely perceived as corrupt and that plea 
bargaining has often acted against their own rational self-interest can be 
supported by:  
1. Perception indexes: Brazil was the country that presented the largest drop in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index of 2015; the 
country now occupies its 76th position (Transparency International 2015). 
2. Opinion polls: in 2015, for the first time Brazilians pointed corruption as the 
country’s biggest problem (Datafolha 2015). In that same year, the Índice de 
Confiança Social (Social Trust Index) has shown that the trust Brazilians 
have in Congress is the second to last out of 18 institutions, being only in 
front of the trust deposited in political parties (Ibope Inteligência 2015). 
Although this deterioration of public opinion alone is insufficient to 
demonstrate that corruption is worsening in the country (it may in fact 
indicate the exact opposite, that is to say, that the successful detection of 
corruption increases the public’s perception of the phenomenon), 
Congress’ dismal reputation certainly allows the interpretation that the 
political class in Brazil is seen as consistently acting against the public 
interest. 
3. Number of implicated parliamentarians: as of June 2016, 134 individuals who 
held office were under formal investigation by the Lava Jato operation 
(Macedo 2016a).  On March 2016, the Lava Jato taskforce apprehended a 
spreadsheet at the house of the president of a major construction 
company in Brazil, which indicated that illegal donations had been made 
to 279 politicians of 22 different parties (Macedo 2016b). The actual 
figures are probably significantly higher, since portions of the 
investigations are considered classified. 
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2.2 Research sub-questions 
Which political and social forces made it possible for plea bargaining to be introduced in 
Brazilian legislation? 
Explaining the reasons behind the COL’s approval requires one to understand 
which coalitions were formed between actors in and out of Congress around 
the formulation and implementation of the law, as well as who were the actors 
that had a capacity to set the agenda in these negotiations. 
 
What were the main assumptions and beliefs upon which such actors were based while 
negotiating the COL? 
Once an understanding is reached as to who the actors were and what 
coalitions they formed, it is relevant to describe the views upon which they 
based their positions and exerted their influence in the legislative process. 
While answering this question, we will describe the stance taken by each 
organization that played a role in shaping the COL. 
 
What were the controversies and points of conflict between the different actors as the legislative 
process moved forward?  
The detection of points of conflict that may have emerged during the crafting 
of the COL is useful to indicate the purposes of each of the actors that 
participated in the process. It is relevant, for instance, to assess whether these 
disagreements have revolved around procedural technicalities or if in fact there 
were actors who opposed the very idea of introducing plea bargains in Brazil. 
As this tool acquired great visibility after the COL’s approval, many voices 
emerged to criticise it, both on legal and on ethical grounds. Verifying 
discrepancies in the criticisms before and after the COL will help to elucidate 
the beliefs each actor espoused when crafting the bill. 
 
Did the main beneficiaries of the COL act strategically during the formulation of the bill, or 
did they merely act with opportunism after its approval? 
The judiciary and the Prosecutor’s Office have arguably been the main 
beneficiaries of the COL, since they took advantage of plea bargaining to 
conduct the Lava Jato operation, thus bolstering their image among the 
Brazilian population and increasing the scope and efficacy of their 
anticorruption activities. In order to gain a further understanding of how the 
COL came to be approved by Congress, it is relevant to know whether these 
specific actors had a prior awareness of the potential applications of plea 
bargaining, thus acting to influence the legislative process accordingly, or if 
instead they only benefitted from the serendipitous and independent creation 
of this instrument by Congress. 
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3   Analytical framework and research methods 
3.1 The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
The anticorruption framework in Brazil has acquired its current format 
through an iterative process spanning decades of evolution. Like any such 
policy process, this one has been marked by struggles between diverse political 
camps and by competing popular pressures negotiated in the policy arena. 
Inevitably, public interest on the matter has also been pitted against the sum 
total of the rational self-interest of (often malevolent) legislators, power 
brokers and special interest groups. Additionally, several private and public 
organizations dedicated to the topic (groups often called ‘epistemic 
communities’ (Haas 1992) acting in ‘policy subsystems’ (Sabatier 1988)) 
attempt to guide policy changes to satisfy their specific objectives. 
This process is so astoundingly complex that understanding even one of 
its many components – in our case, the legislative process that led to the 
approval of the COL – requires a conceptual framework that shows how 
strategic interactions within a policy community bring about succeeding policy 
iterations over time. It is precisely this conceptual framework that Sabatier 
(1988) has developed, naming it the ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF).  
Three main premises underlie the ACF: 1) that assessing policy change 
and learning requires a window of time of at least one decade, to allow insights 
provided by the completion of an entire policy cycle, as well as to verify the 
successes and failures of a program; 2) that within this timeframe, the most 
suitable way of reflecting about policy changes is to view them through the 
lenses of ‘policy subsystems’, that is to say, the assemblage of actors (whether 
individuals or organizations, both inside and outside the state apparatus) who 
are devoted to a certain policy issue; and 3) that such policies can be 
understood in the same way as ‘belief systems’, i.e., “sets of value priorities and 
causal assumptions about how to realize them” (Sabatier 1988: 131). 
The cumulative changes and corrective adjustments that fine-tune the 
anticorruption framework in Brazil can be adequately understood by 
employing the ACF. In the specific case of the COL, the three premises of this 
framework are clearly present: 
1. Timeframe. The implementation of plea bargaining in Brazil has been 
gradual. Since the 1980s, several legal instruments have been slowly 
creating what Brazilian legal scholars consider a new paradigm of 
‘negotiated criminal justice’ (Gomes and da Silva 2015: 164; Mariz 2016, 
personal interview). From the beginning, these instruments have included 
plea bargaining agreements, but only for specific crimes such as kidnapping 
(Law 9.269/96) or crimes against the financial system (Law 8.137/90). Not 
only were these instruments too narrowly applicable, but they were also 
marred by inconsistencies and technical flaws that betrayed their tentative 
(and arguably improvised) nature, causing prosecutors to resort to them 
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only rarely. The COL was the first norm to meticulously systematize plea 
bargaining and the procedures for conducting such negotiations, to such an 
extent that a new jurisprudence has been extending the application of this 
law even to crimes with which it does not deal specifically (Gomes and da 
Silva 2015: 169). The PLS 150/06 was proposed in 2006 and only voted 
and passed by the Congress seven years later. The rationale for Sabatier’s 
recommendation that a timeframe of at least a decade should be observed 
is well illustrated in this case: an entire 
“formulation/implementation/reformulation cycle”, as well as a 
“reasonably accurate portrait of program success and failure” (Sabatier 
1988: 131), can both be seen in regards to plea bargaining in Brazil. 
2. Policy Subsystem. The struggle against corruption involves a wide set of 
actors and organizations which have a say in the formulation and 
implementation of policies. Each organization acts in the policy arena 
aiming to shape decisions according to their own preferences, which can be 
selfish or altruistic in nature. In the specific case of plea bargaining, this 
epistemic community was not exclusively active in the field of 
anticorruption policies, since the designed instrument is applicable to all 
types of organized crime, from drug trafficking and money laundering to 
corruption itself. 
3. Belief Systems. The ACF assumes that “people get involved in politics at 
least in part to translate their beliefs into public policy” (Sabatier 1988: 
132). These belief systems, Sabatier argues, are translated into implicit 
theories that seek to explain how public policies achieve their objectives. 
Therefore, they are the causal driving force that shape policy formulation. 
Although Sabatier’s seminal work did not deal specifically with contexts of 
systemic corruption, one could feasibly argue that even in such scenarios 
the aforementioned assumption is valid, since corrupt individuals who 
attempt to interfere in the legislative process with the goal of avoiding the 
detection and sanctioning for corruption also act according to their ‘value 
priorities’; it just so happens that theirs are malevolent and self-seeking 
ones. 
 
The subdivision of the ACF’s belief systems into three categories is suitable for 
understanding the process which led to the creation of plea bargaining in 
Brazil. Deep core beliefs “include normative and ontological axioms applicable 
to multiple subsystems”; policy core beliefs serve as the basis for the 
attainment of deep core beliefs; and secondary beliefs are instruments designed 
to achieve policy goals (Henry et al. 2014: 300). Employing this sectional 
understanding of belief systems certainly provides insights into why an 
extremely effective anticorruption tool has been approved without 
fundamental controversies by a Congress which is widely perceived as 
systemically corrupt.  
Although the ACF has gained increased popularity in the past 28 years, it 
has predominantly been applied in North America and Europe.  
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Figure 3 
ACF applications thematically, 1987-2006 
 
Source: Weible, Sabatier and McQueen (2009: 127) 
 
 
With regards to the substantive scope of the applications, the fact that the 
ACF originated in studies of environmental/energy policies means that such 
topics have seen the greatest number of case studies. However, researchers in 
other fields have also used the ACF (see Figure 4 below). 
Nevertheless, the ACF’s applicability in contexts of grave 
dysfunctionalities such as corporatism or authoritarianism has been called into 
question (Parsons 1995), but recent summaries of existing applications have 
encouraged its continued use in such contexts, with the caveat that 
“assumptions may need to be questioned, theory developed, context better 
incorporated, and hypotheses rejected and revised to enable comparisons and 
valid insights” (Henry et al. 2014: 308). 
Provided such precautions are observed, the ACF is preferable to the 
most widely-accepted alternative models that could also have been applied 
here, such as the stages heuristics and the punctuated-equilibrium framework:  
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Figure 4 
ACF applications by geographic area, 1987-2006 
 
Source: Weible, Sabatier and McQueen (2009: 126) 
 
 
1. The stages heuristics (Jones 1977; Peters 1986) has been a standard model to 
understand policy processes. It subdivides them into the stages of 
identification of the problem and setting of the agenda; formulation and 
adoption of policy; implementation; evaluation; and reformulation. 
However important the contributions of this model, its limitations have 
also been widely reported. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 177), for 
instance, argue that it is not a causal model, lacking “an identifiable force or 
forces that can drive the policy process from one stage to another and 
generate activity within specific stage.” This shortcoming would be 
particularly problematic in the case of this paper, in which understanding 
the causal forces that propelled the legislative process forward is a 
particular goal. 
2. The punctuated-equilibrium framework (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) has many 
similarities with the ACF, such as its focus on long windows of time for 
policy change. However, one of its views is that major punctuations that 
allow policy implementation are followed by a lasting stability in the policy 
arena, which seems incompatible with the events that followed the 
enactment of the COL, where immediate upheavals and varied attempts of 
policy reformulation ensued. 
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3.2 Research methods 
Given the choice of the ACF as a model, the most adequate method for 
gathering data was to conduct interviews with key actors from organizations 
that participated in the legislative process of the COL. Since the bill was 
formally presented in the Senate only when there was sufficient indication of a 
consensus around the text, the public documents pertaining to it tend to omit 
many of the prior disagreements between the actors involved. Therefore, the 
primary data obtained through interviews has proved revelatory and crucial to 
our findings. 
One of the difficulties brought by this methodology lay in the prolonged 
time period elapsed since the beginning of the policy cycle that led to the 
approval of the COL. Indeed, because the first debates that led to the proposal 
of the PLS 150/06 took place in the early 2000’s, many of the individuals 
involved in them could not recollect the events in minute detail. However, 
interviews with members of the technical staff of the organizations involved 
have usually been exceptions, since their expertise and thematic focus allowed 
them to retain a more thorough memory of the process. Political actors, on the 
other hand, tended to focus on the intricacies of the larger political scenario. A 
rule of thumb devised as a response to this pattern has been that the higher the 
technical expertise possessed by the interviewee, the more structured the 
interview. 
However, the interviews alone have not been sufficient to allow a robust 
retelling of the entire legislative process; thus, complementary information has 
been obtained through secondary data, mostly through records available in the 
websites of both houses of Congress. 
Access to many of the interviewees was obtained through a ‘snowballing’ 
process, i.e., through initial contacts with members of the selected 
organizations who were not directly involved in this particular bill, but knew 
about that organization’s activities and could indicate the most appropriate 
persons to interview. The sample of interviewees thus became comprehensive, 
including actors from all the main organizations that took part in negotiating 
PLS 150/06. 
Annex 1 presents a brief description of the main interviewees. All of them 
have authorised being mentioned in this work. 
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4   Overview of  the anticorruption framework in Brazil 
4.1 Traditional cultural approaches 
In Brazil, a strong tradition of culturally-oriented models has evolved to 
explain corruption in the country. These models are an offshoot of grand 
efforts of interpretation about the origins and formation of Brazilian society, 
which have been a staple of the country’s sociology literature in the twentieth 
century. 
Gilberto Freyre (The Masters and the Slaves, [1933] 1947) claimed that the 
legacy of slavery and plantations has shaped post-colonial Brazil into a 
patriarchal and personalistic society, lenses through which one can understand 
the ingrained nature of corruption in the country. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda 
(Roots of Brazil, 1936) applied Weberian concepts such as patrimonialism to the 
Brazilian reality, by creating the archetype of the ‘cordial man’, and postulated 
that the overflow of emotions into the realm of politics is conducive to a 
confusion between the private and the public spheres, which poses difficulties 
to the implementation of impersonal democratic institutions and ultimately 
leads to corruption. Victor Nunes Leal (Coronelismo: The Municipality and 
Representative Government in Brazil [1948] 1977) analysed how quid pro quo 
dynamics between the central government and the coronéis, local oligarchs who 
dominated political machines, has allowed the latter to engage in widespread 
corruption. Raymundo Faoro (Os Donos do Poder, 1958) noted the persistence of 
patrimonialism as a trait inherited by Brazil from its former colonial power, 
allowing political elites to conduct state affairs with the predominant goal of 
satisfying their private interests. Roberto DaMatta (Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes: 
An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma, [1979] 1991) scrutinized the 
quintessentially Brazilian concepts of the malandro, a kind of charming 
scoundrel, and jeitinho, a friendly type of circumvention of rules and laws in 
order to attain personal benefits, often through petty corruption. Darcy 
Ribeiro (The Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil, [1995] 2000) 
introduced the notion of ‘seigneurial corruption’, whereby the ruling classes 
split its behaviour into two: first, a courteous and refined conduct reserved for 
one’s upper class peers; second, an uncaring and condescending attitude 
towards those deemed to be socially inferior. 
These canonical authors have given invaluable contributions to the 
understanding of the general formative traits of Brazilian society, as well as of 
the systemic corruption which permeates it. Common to their analyses is the 
notion that the ‘original sin’ of an exploitative type of colonization, coupled 
with the legacy of slavery, have given rise to a society in which the impersonal 
egalitarianism of a functional bureaucracy seems unfeasible. This is instead 
replaced by a deeply relational manner of conducting public affairs, out of 
which stems a multitude of dysfunctionalities, such as corruption. In a culture 
where personal relationships inform and contaminate the entire state 
apparatus, it is to be expected that the pillaging of public resources would be 
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protected by a code of silence as solid as the Italian mafia’s omertà. Hence the 
importance of tools designed to break this pact, such as plea bargaining. 
 
4.2 Institutional approaches and the ‘web of accountability’ 
Acknowledging the relevance of the aforementioned traditional approach, 
Power and Taylor (2011: 11) claim that “culturally oriented arguments are a 
wise reminder that institutions can never be analyzed out of context.” Thus, it 
was building upon this legacy that modern approaches have critically analyzed 
the plethora of public sectors organizations which take part in anticorruption 
efforts. 
This newer approach has been largely inspired by the innovative work of 
authors such as Rose-Ackerman (1999) who have geared the study of the 
causes of corruption away from prior approaches that identified correlations 
between levels of corruption and economic efficiency (Leff 1964; Huntington 
1968) and closer to institutional ones. This new model posits that the adequate 
tweaking of institutional arrangements can deter corrupt behaviour – or at least 
provide disincentives for it. In their words, “institutional reforms can move a 
system in the direction of trust based on impartiality and honest dealings and 
away from one based on trust in connections and personal favors” (Rose-
Ackerman 1999: 250). 
Taylor and Buranelli (2007) have divided the Brazilian anticorruption 
framework into three different stages: 1) oversight, which focuses on the early 
detection and prevention of misuse of public funds; 2) investigation, in which 
there is an assessment of the details and search for culpability for past 
malfeasance; and 3) sanctioning, or the actual enforcement of accountability 
for illegal actions. These stages combine to form what Mainwaring (2003) and 
Power and Taylor (2011) call a ‘web of accountability’, that is to say, an 
intricate institutional matrix that allows the understanding of how “the 
interaction between individual institutions influences overall provision of the 
public good of accountability in its three stages” (Taylor and Buranelli 2007: 
63). 
Machado and Paschoal (2016) subdivide the third stage into two: holding 
accountable (or adjudication) and sanctioning. Adjudication takes place in the 
aftermath of investigations or monitoring activities, and is concluded when the 
competent authority attributes the violation of a law to a certain person or 
company. Once culpability is attributed, a second, distinct decision follows, as 
to what will be the punishment for that violation (sanctioning stage). 
According to them, the framework can be visualized as follows. 
Prado and Carson (2014) find that institutional reforms in Brazil have 
proven efficient in regards to the oversight and investigation of corruption, but 
less so when it comes to its punishment. They argue that the institutional 
multiplicity existent in the stages of oversight (with bodies such as the CGU 
and the TCU) and investigation (with the MPF and the PF, for instance) has 
actually contributed to the successful detection of corruption. Conversely, they 
claim that concentrating sanctioning power as the ultimate prerogative of the 
22 
 
judiciary has brought obstacles in the punishment stage of the anticorruption 
framework (Prado and Carson 2014: 4). 
Machado and Paschoal (2016), however, have a less sanguine opinion 
about the institutional multiplicity. They find that this phenomenon is marked 
by the rigid frontiers – both legal and cultural – that separate from one another 
the many organizations that play a role in anticorruption enforcement. In their 
view, the insufficient cooperation between these bodies cannot be explained 
only by the lack of formal legislative regulation; in fact, collaboration between 
actors in Brazil depends on personal trust, which is not feasible in a system 
marked by constant changes in staffing and corporatism. This, again, is a nod 
to the cultural lenses traditionally employed to explain the prevalence of 
corrupt relations in the country. 
Table 1 
 Administrative sphere  
(administrative sanctions  
and disciplinary actions) 
Judicial sphere  
(civil and criminal) 
Support bodies 
Monitoring CGU; Internal Affairs; TCU  Coaf/MF 
Investigation CEP; CGU; CPIs; Internal 
Affairs; Ethics Commission; 
CNJ; CNMP; TCU 
Judiciary, MP; Civil 
Police; PF 
Coaf/MF; DRCI/MJ 
Adjudication CGU; Internal Affairs; CNJ; 
CNMP TCU 
MP; judiciary; AGU Coaf/MF; DRCI/MJ 
Sanctioning CGU; AGU; CNJ; CNMP Judiciary; MP; AGU Coaf/MF; DRCI/MJ 
Source: Translated from Machado and Paschoal (2016: 21) 
 
In light of the contribution of the literature described above, the 
dysfunctionalities that mark the sentencing stage of the anticorruption 
framework in Brazil can be summarized as follows:  
1. The excessive complexity and formalism of the criminal procedure causes 
trials to be cumbersome and slow. The wide variety of appeals at the 
disposal of defendants, for instance, causes proceedings to move so slowly 
that often statute of limitations prevents punishment from occurring. 
According to CNJ (2013), in 2010 and 2011, 2,918 cases of corruption 
were thrown out for this reason, a number which represents roughly 10% 
of the cases in those years (which does not mean that the remaining 90% 
were resolved, as most of them likely remained pending trial). Symbolically, 
the corruption charges against the former president Fernando Collor have 
been dismissed for reaching statutes of limitations in 2014, 22 years after 
his impeachment. Alencar and Gico (2011) have analysed cases of civil 
servants who have been fired due to corruption to estimate that the 
probability of an ensuing criminal lawsuit being filed is below 30%, while 
the probability of a final conviction is of an astonishingly low 3%. 
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2. The institutional concentration of punishment authority in the hands of the 
judiciary prevents its aforementioned underperformance in corruption 
cases from being compensated by successful actions by other 
organizations, as occurs in the stages of oversight and investigation. Even 
with multiple agencies competent to punish corrupt agents administratively 
(see table 1 above), these decisions are often subsequently contested in 
courts, and the judiciary is then legally forced to act as the ultimate arbiter 
of the litigation. Prado and Carson (2014) interpret several recent initiatives 
as attempts to assuage the negative impacts of institutional concentration, 
by rendering the consequences of administrative decisions immediate. This 
is the case, for instance, of decisions by the TCU and CGU which seek to 
impose immediate financial and reputational costs to those convicted. It is 
also the case of the Lei da Ficha Limpa (Clean Record Law), by which 
electoral courts can prohibit those who have been convicted of corruption 
from running for office, even if that conviction is still being appealed. 
3. There is a lack of inter-agency cooperation within the anticorruption 
framework, hindering the successful prosecution of cases. Besides the 
reasons pointed by Machado and Paschoal (2016) (namely, the overreliance 
on personal connections as a requirement for cooperation), there are also 
deep-rooted reasons for organizational insularity. One of the most obvious 
examples is the animosity between the MP and police agencies (such as the 
PF), a competition that can be traced back to the democratization process 
of the 1980s and to the enactment of the Constitution in 1988. According 
to Arantes (2012), during this period, police agencies were “harshly 
criticized for their association with the authoritarian regime, and also for 
their inefficiency in conducting criminal investigations.” As we will see in 
the next section of this chapter, the MP has taken advantage of this 
vacuum to greatly increase its institutional role, leading to a long-standing 
dispute between the two organizations. The negotiations of the COL have 
been a clear example of this, as we will see in chapter 5. 
Even though there is no evidence that plea bargaining was conceived with 
the specific intention of addressing these dysfunctionalities, ultimately it 
appears to do so, with varying degrees of success: 
1. It reduces complexity and formalism in criminal procedure by introducing 
negotiation as an instrument for uncovering and proving crimes, as well as 
by expediting the trials of those who sign plea agreements. This prima facie 
improvement, however, will only be objectively demonstrable once a 
substantial number of final sentences is issued in the Lava Jato and in other 
criminal trials that rely on plea bargaining. 
2. Although it does not transfer sanctioning powers to the MPF, it puts 
prosecutors in a position to bargain with defendants for reduced sentences, 
thus deconcentrating somewhat the authority of the judge, who merely 
oversees and issues a final approval of the plea bargain. 
3. It fosters inter-agency cooperation, since the successful negotiation of the 
plea requires the PF, the MPF and the judiciary to coordinate actions. Since 
the instrument  has  been  so effective, there is a  strong incentive for them 
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do so, thus overcoming the aforementioned cultural barriers and lack of a 
robust legal framework for cooperation. The MPF itself, for instance, has 
acknowledged the increase in cooperation with the PF during the Lava 
Jato, by stating: “The Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the Federal police 
worked in an integrated way. Both have been and continue to be essential 
to the success of the case. The measures requested to courts and 
implemented by the police have been made with the agreement of the 
Prosecutor’s Office, and the activities of federal prosecutors have been 
agreed upon and supported by the PF. The case is an example of united 
efforts in the struggle against corruption, impunity and organized crime” 
(MPF 2016b). Nevertheless, there have been contentious disputes between 
these organizations during the negotiations of the COL (see chapter 5). 
Moreover, the MPF has filed a Direct Unconstitutionality Action (a legal 
remedy which challenges in the supreme court the constitutionality of a 
law) against portions of the COL which allow police commissioners 
(instead of only prosecutors) to negotiate plea agreements. PF 
commissioners have reacted to this by stating that “it seems very strange 
that in the exact moment when the PF is conducting the largest 
investigations against corruption, an action like this is filed”, and that “it 
could lead to the annulment of important investigations, such as the Lava 
Jato”, concluding that the “criminal organizations which affront Brazilians 
are celebrating” (ADPF 2016). These disagreements suggest that even if 
inter-agency cooperation does occur, it is concentrated at the 
implementation stage of the policy cycle, rather than at the formulation 
one. 
An accurate and in-depth assessment of the effect of plea bargaining on 
the Brazilian criminal justice system can only be undertaken once a critical 
mass of data is available about the changes in the dysfunctionalities pointed by 
the literature in the institutional structure set up against corruption in Brazil, 
particularly at the punishment stage. However, the initial impact of this tool is 
evident. Considering that its implementation is not exceedingly complex and 
that it touches upon several of the specific problems pointed by the literature 
cited above, plea bargaining can therefore be seen as an example of the 
institutional tweaks suggested by Rose-Ackerman (1999). 
4.3  The 1988 Constitution and the new role of the 
Ministério Público (MP) 
As the COL entered into force and the Lava Jato operation ensued, the 
significance of the MP’s institutional role within the Brazilian anticorruption 
framework became even more clear. The origins of the MP’s eminence, 
however, can be traced back to the promulgation of the 1988 Federal 
Constitution of Brazil. 
Following two decades of a military-led authoritarian regime (1964-1985), 
the Constitutional Assembly of 1987-1988 brought about an unprecedented 
renewal of the state apparatus and of its institutional design. Among  the  most 
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important changes was the strengthening of the role of the MP and of its 
federal offshoot, the MPF. Some go so far as claiming that this change can be 
considered “the biggest institutional innovation in the last 30 years [in Brazil]” 
(Arantes 2007: 327). 
Modelled after the French Ministère Public, the MP had existed in Brazil 
since the 1934 Constitution, but in 1988 it acquired a much more prominent 
standing in the country’s legal system. Tellingly, the constitutional text situated 
the norms pertaining to it in chapter 5 (‘The Essential Functions of Justice’), 
which lies outside of the provisions related to the three branches of power, 
denoting the MP’s unprecedented independence. Moraes (2015: 430) claims 
that “the federal constitution of 1988 has attributed the state functions to the 
three traditional branches (legislative, executive and judiciary) and to the MP, 
which, among other important roles, must ensure inter-branch balance (by 
acting as their watchdog) and the respect for fundamental rights.” Article 127 
of the Constitution defines the MP’s role as “the defence of the legal order, of 
the democratic regime and of the social and inalienable individual rights”, and 
its fifth paragraph establishes certain guarantees for its members, such as 
immovability (a prosecutor can only be re-stationed if they consent to it) and 
tenure (after two years in the MP, prosecutors can only be terminated by a final 
judicial decision). 
This institutional independence was coupled with a powerful new 
instrument, rendering the Brazilian MP a uniquely active and autonomous 
body. This instrument was the Public Civil Action, a type of legal proceeding 
meant to protect ‘meta-individual rights’ (see glossary). Although other 
organizations can file such actions (e.g. the executive branch in all levels; 
government agencies; civil associations, etc.), the MP has become by far the 
most frequent plaintiff. Arantes (1999: 99) claims there are no reliable statistics, 
but Sadek (1997) estimates that approximately 90% of public civil actions are 
filed by the MP. Arantes (1999: 99) posits that this predominance is due to: 1) 
the comparatively greater experience acquired by the MP while acting as 
prosecutor; 2) the MP’s prerogatives in accessing privileged documents and 
information; and 3) the MP’s capacity to conduct civil inquiries, i.e., 
administrative investigations conducted to probe violations of meta-individual 
rights. 
What were the reasons that led the Constitutional Assembly to offer such 
innovative and significant functions to the MP? The Assembly, formed in the 
aftermath of the democratization process, was notorious for opening space for 
various groups to lobby for their interests. Among the multiple government 
agencies and civil society organizations that did so, the MP was arguably the 
most successful. The literature points to several historical reasons for this, 
which Kerche (2010: 120) summarizes as follows: 1) the early and successful 
efforts by CONAMP, the MP’s representative association, to unify the intra-
agency position about the role  the  MP should have in the new Constitution, a 
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position clearly and cogently consolidated in the ‘Letter from Curitiba5’; and 2) 
the propitious environment found by the MP in the Assembly to promote the 
idea of a non-partisan agency tasked with defending society’s interests. This 
environment was welcoming to the MP’s claims because of the trauma caused 
by more than twenty years of an authoritarian regime, which left members of 
the Assembly particularly receptive to proposals that sought to strengthen 
democratic guarantees within the constitutional framework6. 
With this newly acquired constitutional status, the MP began to expand its 
scope of activities and became a new protagonist in national politics, by 
introducing litigation in topics such as the provision of healthcare or 
environmental protection. The prerogatives granted by the Constitution 
“allowed the MP to act in issues that were traditionally reserved to political 
agents. That is to say, there has been a kind of ‘substitution’ of elected 
representatives for MP representatives, who derive their legitimacy from non-
electoral mechanisms” (Kerche 2010: 109). This expansion, which includes a 
more active stance within the anticorruption framework, is the expression of a 
self-perceived role that Arantes (2007: 333) calls ‘political voluntarism’. This 
ideology leads members of the MP to see themselves as the ‘political agents of 
the law’. The main motivations for this are: 
1. A pessimistic evaluation of the capacity of civil society to defend itself 
autonomously (…); 2. A pessimistic evaluation of the political-representative 
powers, which are, in their view, corrupted and/or incapable of fulfilling their 
roles; and 3. In light of this, an idealization of the political role of the MP, as a 
representative of this incapable society (although without an explicit mandate and 
with no accountability mechanisms) vis-à-vis inept governments which do not 
ensure the enforcement of laws (Arantes 2007: 333). 
Nevertheless, until recently this role was limited to the MP’s constitutional 
right to petition courts. Indeed, the political voluntarism manifested itself 
through the filing of lawsuits that had political overtones and were often 
attempts to interfere in policy formulation, mostly through public civil actions. 
Power and Taylor (2011: 19) argue that the MP’s necessary “reliance on 
proximate institutions such as the Federal Police (for investigation) and the 
courts (for trials) has also limited its efficacy.” However, as we will see in 
chapter 6, the Lava Jato arguably brings pivotal qualitative changes in the role 
of the MP. 
5 The ‘Letter from Curitiba’ (1986) was produced in the First Meeting of Prosecutor-
Generals and Presidents of the MP Associations, in the capital of Paraná. It 
synthetized the MP’s claims to the National Constitutional Assembly. This early 
unification of the MP’s stance allowed key actors within the agency to organize a 
consistent and quasi-professional effort of lobbying, as described by Dal Pozzo (2002: 
9-10). 
6 Besides Kerche (2010), for detailed accounts of the MP’s lobbying efforts in the 
Constitutional Assembly, see Mazzilli (1998), Dal Pozzo (2002) and Sabella (2008). 
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5  The legislative process leading to the COL 
5.1 The origins of the debate 
The shift towards a model of criminal justice that contemplates negotiation as 
a means of evidence-gathering has been a pivotal element in the struggle to 
overcome the shortcomings of the Brazilian anticorruption framework, 
particularly in its punishment stage. Plea bargaining has been a key component 
of this shift. Plea bargaining, a key component of this shift (Mariz 2016, 
personal interview), had already been included in Brazilian legislation since the 
1980s, but significant legislative flaws prevented it from being applied 
frequently by prosecutors and judges. 
The excessively generic format of the instrument in previous legislation, 
which did not detail how negotiations should be made, led different judges to 
adopt different procedures, allowing appeals to successfully annul pleas or at 
least stall trials (Sanchonete 2016, personal interview). Additionally, Judge 
Sérgio Moro, who later became responsible for the Lava Jato cases, found that 
“plea bargaining is not frequently applied in the Brazilian judicial practice, 
perhaps because of the relatively inefficient criminal justice system. There is no 
reason for those under investigation to confess and try to obtain a benefit if 
there are low chances that they will be subjected to effective judicial action, 
now or in the near future” (Moro 2004: 59). 
Aware of these shortcomings, several actors involved in initiatives against 
corruption and organized crime began to suggest changes in the legislation. 
The debate began to take shape during two Parliamentary Inquiry 
Commissions: the Public Safety CPI and the Banestado CPI. 
In January 2002, a sudden increase in violent crimes, particularly of 
kidnapping cases7, led to the creation of a CPI to assess the causes and 
promote measures to tackle the violence. In its final report, the Public Safety 
CPI proposed a bill dealing with criminal organizations (PLS 118/02). This bill 
already contained a thorough regulation of plea bargaining, but was ultimately 
rejected due to divergences between the MPF and the PF. 
In 2003, the Banestado CPI was created. This inquiry commission 
originated from a PF operation that investigated illicit financial flows to the 
New York branch of the Banestado. Between 1996 and 1997, several doleiros 
had received funds in these accounts and subsequently transferred them to tax 
havens. These funds, which amounted to an estimated US$ 37.8 billion, 
allegedly came from various illegal activities, and the operations were rumoured 
to involve several prominent politicians. The investigations led to the creation 
of the CPI in the beginning of Lula’s first term. However, the procedures only 
7 The concern about kidnapping was due to the appearance of ‘lighting kidnappings’, 
in which the victim remains with the criminals for a few hours, withdrawing cash from 
ATMs, making purchases with credit cards, and often having their families contacted 
to send sums of money. Although there are no reliable national statistics referring to 
that period, there was a “wave” of such crimes in states such as São Paulo, according 
to Izumino and Neme (2002). 
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led to recommendations of indictments, but no politicians were ultimately 
prosecuted. Although some claim (Beirangê 2015) that the CPI was terminated 
by a backdoor deal between the PT and the PSDB, its president, former 
senator Antero Barros, insists that a political deadlock was the reason for this 
termination, but that its final report made several recommendations for 
legislative measures (Barros 2016, personal interview). 
In any case, these two CPIs intensified debates about the need for a new 
law to deal with money laundering and the repercussions of organized crime, 
and the agenda was definitively set around this topic. The MPF was already 
very active and lobbied for a text that expanded its role in investigative 
proceedings. Members of the judiciary (including Moro) were also energetic in 
suggesting changes to the text and correcting its technical flaws (Odon 2016, 
personal interview; Barros 2016, personal interview; Sanchonete 2016, personal 
interview). 
As previously mentioned, plea bargaining already existed in Brazil, and 
despite the incomplete and flawed legislation, judges were still carrying these 
negotiations out. Moro was one of the first to engage in these agreements 
during the Banestado CPI. The consensus was that the instrument needed to 
be further regulated in order to become more efficient, “without provoking 
doubts that would later cause procedures to be annulled by upper courts” 
(Sanchonete 2016, personal interview). 
Although the MPF and the judiciary had cooperated with each other 
during the Banestado CPI, they could not agree on what attributions would be 
assigned to each body in this new law. Finally, a “mixed model” prevailed 
(Odon 2016, personal interview), in which the MPF negotiates plea bargains 
and the judge issues a final decision on the legality of the procedure. 
Lawmakers connected to these two organizations then began talks with the 
technical staff of Congress, in order to produce an official text and formalize 
the bill. 
5.2 First controversies prior to the proposal of the bill 
Before this happened, however, certain controversies took place. Members of 
the executive branch, particularly in the Ministry of Justice, felt that the text 
was too “excessive and authoritarian” (Odon 2016, personal interview) and 
could give rise to claims that it violated fundamental rights and due process of 
law. Previous versions of the bill, for instance, did not require lawyers to be 
present at all moments of the plea negotiation, something that was viewed as 
unconstitutional by many. 
The leading organization in safeguarding the observance of fundamental 
rights was the Ministry of Justice’s Secretariat of Legislative Affairs (SAL), 
which had undergone an institutional renovation in the previous years and was 
acquiring a more noticeable role in the formulation of criminal proceedings 
legislation. According to Marivaldo Pereira, a former Secretary who 
participated in the negotiations of the PLS 150/06, the Ministry of Justice’s 
involvement in legislative processes in general is different than that of other 
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ministries. Usually, ministries have both a legal department and a parliamentary 
office. The latter collects and unifies the information about the positions of the 
ministry and takes it to Congress. However, a lack of technical expertise means 
that this office tends to have limited capacity for conducting negotiations in 
Congress. In the Ministry of Justice, on the other hand, SAL is a body that 
unifies the Ministry’s position, but also has a say on the matter, particularly in 
regards to its legal aspects. It has a final say, for instance, in issues related to 
criminal law and criminal proceedings. Therefore, SAL’s staff have the capacity 
to not only take the Ministry’s position to Congress, but also to negotiate 
matters therein (Pereira 2016, personal interview). This prominent role began 
when Márcio Thomaz Bastos was Minister (2003-2007), with the active 
participation of the then Secretary Pedro Abramovay.  
When this institutional shift occurred, SAL’s stance on matters of criminal 
proceedings began to adhere more vocally to the legal theory of Garantismo 
Penal, which posits that criminal law should be subordinate to the principle of 
human dignity and of fundamental rights, thus safeguarding ordinary citizens 
against State abuse (Ferrajoli 2006). Some members of SAL, particularly those 
connected to the University of São Paulo Law School and to lawyers’ 
associations, tended to resist measures deemed excessively authoritative, 
especially in regards to the special technique of police infiltration in criminal 
organizations through undercover agents.  
It is curious to note, however, that SAL’s reluctance to accept the most 
forceful measures in the bill did not count with the vocal support of civil 
society organizations, since neither human rights NGOs nor those devoted to 
anticorruption initiatives participated actively in the process, which was 
restricted “to the legislative sphere and to agencies devoted to public safety 
issues and to combatting money laundering” (Sanchonete 2016, personal 
interview).   
Pereira (2016, personal interview) claims that human rights NGOs were 
absent because there were other topics which at the time seemed more 
“attractive” to them. The Lei das Cautelares (a law that defines when preventive 
detention can take place), for instance, was perceived by human rights 
organizations as important, given their concern with mass incarceration. On 
the other hand, proposals that had an exceedingly procedural and technical 
character were not actively followed by NGOs. Even in Congress, Pereira 
claims, many do not pay attention to these debates, which are then captured by 
parliamentarians who have strong ties to the organizations directly affected by 
the policies proposed, such as the MPF and the judiciary. It is only now, with 
the newly-acquired visibility of plea bargains, that civil society has begun to get 
involved in the debates. 
As for the absence of NGOs active in the anticorruption agenda, Josmar 
Verillo, director of one of a leading anticorruption NGOs in Brazil, 
AMARRIBO, claims that this was due to the fact that plea bargaining appeared 
to be an instrument that did not fit into Brazilian culture. Since NGOs felt that 
Brazilian society would not welcome the behaviour of an informant, they 
wrongly believed that the instrument would be ineffective (Verillo 2016, 
personal interview). 
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On the other hand, SAL did face opposition to its garantista stance within 
the National Strategy for Fighting Corruption and Money Laundering 
(ENCCLA), a collegiate body composed by more than 60 public sector 
organizations that have a role in anticorruption strategies in Brazil. Members of 
ENCCLA have criticised SAL’s posture as obstructionist and claimed that 
since SAL was the organization within ENCCLA that was entitled to liaise 
with Congress, its reluctance delayed ENCCLA’s input about the bill to a 
certain extent (Sanchonete 2016, personal interview). 
Nevertheless, due to its strength as the representative of the Presidency in 
the debates, SAL succeeded in removing measures that, despite being agreed 
upon by the MPF, the judiciary and police commissioners, were seen by the 
executive branch as violating fundamental rights. Ultimately, consensus was 
reached within ENCCLA, which then not only lent its support to the bill, but 
elected it as one of its priorities. Automatically, then, SAL (and therefore the 
Presidency) also prioritized the bill. This is usually a significant step in 
obtaining its approval in Congress. According to Pereira (2016, personal 
interview), “besides following every proposal in Congress that relates to topics 
within the competencies of the Ministry of Justice, SAL also works actively to 
ensure that its priority bills move forward as fast as possible in Congress.” 
5.3 The negotiations in Congress 
At this point, a text was finalized under the auspices of the Senate's 
Subcommittee for Public Safety, which deals with violent criminality in Brazil. 
When the executive branch, through SAL, was convinced that a consensus 
about the text could be reached, the bill was officially presented in the Senate. 
Its authorship was attributed to the then PT Senator Serys Slhessarenko, a 
member of that Subcommittee. Although the senator claims to have been 
inspired by the outrage she felt while witnessing the inexplicable enrichment of 
her colleagues (Slhessarenko 2016, personal interview), there are no available 
indications that corruption was a topic with which she had a particular 
familiarity (Odon 2016, personal interview). In 47 speeches delivered at the 
plenary sessions of the Senate in 2006 (the year the bill was proposed), 
corruption was never her main chosen subject (although she did refer to 
nepotism twice). This reinforces the argument that advocacy groups dedicated 
to public safety and the struggle against criminal organizations had formed a 
robust coalition around the text, merely looking for a member of Congress to 
take ownership of the bill. 
The choices of rapporteurs in both houses of Congress indicates that the 
bill had indeed become a priority for the government. The rapporteur is a 
member of parliament designated to present a report to the subcommittees in 
Congress, which carries significant weight in the approval of the bill.  
In the Senate, the rapporteur was Aloizio Mercadante, who then acted as 
the leader of PT in the house and would later become Minister of Science and 
Technology, Minister of Education and the President’s Chief of Staff. The 
nomination of such a prominent figure was an important step in forming 
consensus, since he used his political capital to open space for other bodies to 
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set the agenda and resist the lobby from the PF to increase its role in the 
negotiation of plea bargains. He increased the space, for instance, for 
ENCCLA to voice its opinion about the bill, by sponsoring public hearings on 
the matter, thus showing that a multitude of agencies were in agreement about 
it. Sanchonete (2016, personal interview) says that  
We had the very good fortune of having Senator Mercadante nominated as the 
CCJ rapporteur. He was the one who decided to have a public hearing about the 
bill, in which ENCCLA was given space, so we went to the Senate and presented 
our view. In the case of plea bargaining, we wanted the tool to be ampler, in 
regards to the number of possible offers to be made to informants and to the 
moments in the procedures in which bargains could be offered. 
This public hearing took place on June 2009. A mere 6 months later, the 
bill was approved in the Senate. The clout yielded by Mercadante ensured that 
the bill was swiftly approved (Odon 2016, personal interview). 
After its approval in the Senate, the bill moved to the lower house of 
Congress, where the designated rapporteur was Deputy Carlos Vieira da 
Cunha. Three main reasons explain this choice. First, as a career prosecutor, 
Vieira participated intensely in debates and legislative initiatives related to 
public safety and the struggle against violent crime. Second, he was close to the 
then Minister of Justice, José Eduardo Cardozo, having formed a personal 
relationship with him when both were deputies in the prior legislature. He was 
thus assigned to work on bills deemed a priority by the Presidency, since 
Cardozo wanted to “make sure that priority bills fell into hands that they knew 
would give an adequate treatment to the subject” (Vieira 2016, personal 
interview). Third, even though he was a career member of the MPF (one of the 
organizations that vied for a stronger presence in criminal investigations), he 
was perceived by the competing bodies (the judiciary and the PF) as flexible 
enough to be able to build consensus around the text. Indeed, he claims that 
legislative proposals that changed procedures in criminal trials have always 
been contentious due to corporatist competition, which requires political 
actors with a high capacity for inter-agency dialogue to get bills passed. He says 
that divergences between the MPF and the Federal Police, for instance, 
“usually paralyze legislative processes” (Vieira 2016, personal interview), as had 
happened with the PLS 118/02. For Pereira (2016, personal interview), any 
“legislative debate that involves criminal procedural matters causes tensions 
between the MPF, the judiciary and police commissioners”, often leading the 
legislative process to a halt. 
Despite this careful choice of names to handle the legislative process, 
there were still disagreements in Congress. Vieira cites as an example the care 
that had to be taken in ensuring that judges act as overseers of the entire plea 
bargain process, as a way to shield the instrument against accusations of 
violating constitutional rights. As it stands, judges do not participate directly in 
the negotiations of pleas, but only intervene in the final steps of the procedure 
to attest their legality. For this reason, also, Vieira vehemently rejects 
accusations that plea bargains serve as a tool of coercion that violates the 
defendant’s civil liberties (Vieira 2016, personal interview).  
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However, the biggest obstacles faced in Congress were disputes over the 
roles to be played by each organization (the judiciary, the MPF and police 
commissioners). In these situations, an active intervention by representatives 
of the executive branch is often the tool required to break such deadlocks:  
SAL always tries to have debates about legislative policy in criminal matters, in 
which compromises must be reached. This is the importance of having an active 
executive branch. If we let these matters run loose in Congress, the 
representatives of the careers begin to fight and the bill dies. At SAL, what we 
did was calling upon representatives of each of these organizations, individually, 
to seek agreements, with the participation of parliamentarians. Having capable 
rapporteurs is important precisely because they build such compromises (Pereira 
2016, personal interview).  
Therefore, SAL acted as a consensus-builder and sought such agreements. 
Specific technical changes were proposed at the lower house (such as the 
reduction in penalties for crimes committed by persons under investigation, or 
the increase from three to four as the minimum number of people required for 
the crime of belonging to a criminal organization to occur). Accordingly, the 
bill returned to the Senate for a final vote. 
The general perception seems to be that the divergences that did occur 
were never related to oppositions to the instrument of plea bargaining as such. 
Sanchonete (2016, personal interview) claims that by the time ENCCLA was 
called to participate more actively in the debates, through their presence in the 
2009 public hearings, there were no voices that stood against plea bargaining. 
Barros (2016, personal interview) agrees that there was a consensus among the 
actors involved about the need and adequacy of plea bargaining as proposed. 
The bill was finally approved by the Senate and became a law on August 2, 
2013. 
In his final report in the Senate, the last rapporteur, Senator Eduardo 
Braga, wrote that “all of us who work with legislative processes know that we 
often waste opportunities to present important laws to the country, given the 
difficulties to reach an understanding between the different members of the 
criminal justice system. In the present case, it is laudatory that consensus was 
reached” (Braga 2013). 
5.4 Thematic focus throughout the negotiations 
The predominant role played by the Senate's Subcommittee for Public Safety 
in crafting the bill is already an indication that the text was an initiative of 
advocacy groups whose agendas revolve around the struggle against violent 
crimes, such as kidnapping or drug trafficking. Vieira agrees that originally, the 
focus of those participating in the debates about the bill was public safety, i.e., 
“the struggle against traditional criminal organizations” (Vieira 2016, personal 
interview). The COL has been used to this end as well, but the Lava-Jato 
Operation has reached such a dimension that the general public perceives a 
strong link between plea bargaining and the struggle against corruption. This 
has become the “visible face” of plea bargaining. 
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Even in the realm of activities of the ENCCLA, the focus was on the so-
called ‘special investigation techniques’, “procedures habitually used in the 
investigation of complex cases of serious criminal activities, such as drug, arms 
and human trafficking; crimes committed through criminal organizations; 
financial crimes; money laundering; and terrorism and its financing” (Conteúdo 
Jurídico 2011). International organizations such as the FATF recommended 
these techniques, which include plea bargaining, and were pressuring Brazil to 
regulate them. The prosecution of money laundering was also troublesome, 
because Brazilian legislation required it to be accompanied by an ‘antecedent 
crime’ (the crime through which the money was illegally acquired, e.g., drug 
trafficking), and since there was no legal definition of ‘organized crime’, this 
could not be used as such. Therefore, the focus of the debates was not on 
corruption, but money laundering (Sanchonete 2016, personal interview). 
Braga’s final report to Congress as the last rapporteur of the bill is a 
further indication of this thematic focus, since it stated that “Brazil urgently 
needs to approve this bill. For years the problem of defining ‘criminal 
organizations’ is a burden in our legal system. Even with the ratification of the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo 
Convention), which recommends such definition, the Brazilian legal system is 
still lacking a clear law to close this gap” (Braga 2016). 
When asked whether corruption had been a specific focus of the bill prior 
to its approval, its author said that for her, personally, it had, but that “she 
could not advertise this too much, or her peers would never pass the law” 
(Slhessarenko 2016, personal interview). Senator Barros claims that none of the 
actors in Congress involved in the bill “could have imagined that events would 
turn out as they did” (Barros 2016, personal interview), that is to say, that an 
operation of the magnitude of the Lava Jato would take place. Pereira (2016, 
personal interview) states that “in a scenario where several members of 
Congress are under investigation, the proposal of a measure such as plea 
bargaining in the context of anticorruption debates would not be approved”, 
and that “this bill advanced quickly only because it was debated in a context of 
the fight against organized crime”, to such an extent that “as soon as 
corporatist conflicts were resolved and consensus built, the bill advanced 
easily.” For Vieira (2016, personal interview), if his former colleagues at the 
legislative knew the reach that plea bargaining would acquire, passing the law 
would have been significantly more difficult. If “well-known figures in 
Parliament, some of whom are themselves defendants in trials, had been aware 
that the law could serve as an instrument to all of the advances we have 
witnessed in the investigation of corruption cases, approving the bill would 
have been very difficult, if not impossible. I even joke that some influential 
figures in Congress were ‘taking a nap’ and didn’t realize at the time the reach 
that this piece of legislation could have” (Vieira 2016, personal interview). 
34 
 
6   Applying the ACF in the negotiations of  PLS 150/06 
6.1 The ACF components as revelatory of substantive 
consensus around plea bargaining 
Disassembling the legislative process of the COL into the multiple elements 
that form the ACF reveals how unusual this policy process has been. Table 2 
describes the positioning of each of the organizations active during the 
negotiations of the PLS 150/06, as follows: 
   Table 2 
Organization Main goals Stance on plea bargaining 
SAL Consensus-building; civil rights; 
fundamental rights; due process 
In favor, provided individual rights 
were preserved (Garantismo) 
ENCCLA Consensus-building; compliance to 
international treaties; legal definition of 
organized crime; regulation of special 
techniques of investigation 
In favor 
MPF Stronger investigation instruments for 
prosecutors; increased role in criminal 
proceedings 
In favor, with strong role for the 
MPF 
PF Stronger investigation instruments for 
the police; increased role in criminal 
proceedings 
In favor, with strong role for the 
PF 
Judiciary Consensus-building; increased role in 
criminal proceedings for judges 
In favor; agreed to act as 
overseer of procedures 
Human rights 
NGOs 
Civil rights; fundamental rights; due 
process 
Absent during the legislative 
process. Today, they do not voice 
opposition to plea bargaining, but 
act as watchdogs against 
violations of fundamental rights 
Anticorruption 
NGOS 
Increased accountability; increased 
transparency; stronger investigation 
tools 
Absent during the legislative 
process. Today, they are strongly 
in favor of plea bargaining. 
Brazilian Bar 
Association 
(OAB) 
Respect for due process; assurance 
that lawyers are present throughout 
criminal proceedings 
Feeble presence during the 
legislative process. Today, it 
pressures for preventive prisons 
not to be used as coercion tool for 
plea bargains  
Media Divulging corruption cases; stoking 
popular opinion 
Feeble presence during the 
legislative process. Today, it is 
central in promoting popular 
support for the Lava Jato, and is 
mostly against legal changes to 
limit plea bargaining 
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As for lawmakers, those who were closely connected to one of the 
aforementioned organizations have pressured for its interests to be 
contemplated (e.g., Deputy João Campos, a former police commissioner, 
lobbied for an increased procedural role for the police; Senator Demóstenes 
Torres, a former prosecutor, did the same for the MPF). Since the bill was 
largely viewed in Congress at the time as an exclusively procedural matter, in 
general the Members of Parliament without ties to such organizations were not 
actively involved in the negotiations. 
Although the groups described in the table above are not monolithic, they 
have shown a remarkable integration in voicing their positions in the policy 
arena during this process. ENCCLA’s unity, for instance, has been a notable 
achievement considering that this body is composed by over sixty 
organizations. Sanchonete (2016, personal interview) states that  
ENCCLA worked very intensely in Congress and managed to approve the bill as 
it wanted. But this was only successful because all organizations in ENCCLA 
were united in spirit; there was an international demand for plea bargaining to be 
implemented as a special technique of investigation, as part of international 
agreements of which Brazil is a signatory [such as the Palermo convention]. 
Indeed, the most striking trait of the legislative process has been the fact 
that the formation of a coalition has not faced substantive opposition or 
dissenting views about plea bargaining. Rather, disagreements have taken the 
form of corporatist competition. These inter-agency disputes dominated the 
process to the point of constituting the participant’s very policy core beliefs, 
within the ACF’s belief systems, as seen in table 3. 
It is noticeable that the deep core beliefs found in the policy arena 
(namely, a dispute between garantismo and a zero tolerance policy against 
corruption and organized crime) did not develop into a feud about plea 
bargaining as such. Consequently, as the policy deadlock was due to a mere 
manifestation of corporatist clashes, the most central element in explaining the 
approval of the bill was the apt intervention of politically capable policy 
brokers. 
The nomination of such capable brokers has resulted from SAL’s decision 
to prioritize the bill. Therefore, visible control over the policy process can be 
exerted by the executive branch, since the detection of the importance of the 
bill has caused one of its ministries to throw its political weight upon the bill, 
which has been sufficient to overcome deadlock. Chen (2003: 60) finds that 
“the ACF approach tends to overplay the role of sovereigns as ‘neutral 
arbitrators’”, because “key sovereigns [in his case, two ministers for communication; in 
ours, two rapporteurs of the bill, as well as SAL] needed to act with only limited 
reference to subsystem actors and could effectively ignore the interests of the 
high and no regulation coalitions”. We, on the other hand, find that policy 
deadlock brought about by corporatist competition can effectively be 
surpassed if there is enough political will in the executive branch (that is to say, 
if ‘sovereigns’ do not act ‘neutrally’) coupled with high inter-agency 
coordination (as seen in our case with ENCCLA). 
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Table 3 
ACF Component Application in the COL 
Relatively Stable 
Parameters 
Basic Attribute of the 
Problem Area 
Social revulsion against corruption and organized crime 
Basic distribution of natural 
resources 
Malevolent, self-interested and rational lawmakers in 
dispute with anticorruption epistemic community and 
citizenry 
Fundamental cultural values 
and social structure 
Accountability, transparency and state's sanctioning 
power vs systemic corruption, clientelism and corporatism 
Basic constitutional structure Lack of inter-agency cooperation; complexity and 
formalism in criminal procedural law; low conviction rate 
in corruption cases 
Policy Subsystem 
Territorial scope Federal legislation; international treaties; international 
scope of money laundering 
Substantive scope Anticorruption policies; enforcement against organized 
crime 
Policy participants SAL; ENCCLA; MPF; PF; judiciary; human rights NGOS; 
anticorruption NGOs; OAB 
Belief Systems 
Deep core beliefs Zero tolerance policy against organized crime and 
corruption vs Garantismo Penal (respect for fundamental 
rights) 
Policy core beliefs Increasing agency role in criminal procedure 
Secondary beliefs Plea bargaining as efficient procedural instrument 
Advocacy coalitions MPF vs PF vs Judiciary 
Policy broker 
SAL as consensus-seeker and safeguard for fundamental 
rights. Senator Mercadante and Deputy Vieira da Cunha 
as rapporteurs 
Resources 
Legal framework provided by international treaties; 
experience acquired through Banestado and Public 
Safety CPIs 
Venues Federal legislature 
Mechanisms of 
Policy Change 
Accumulation of Evidence Increase in impact of organized crime; observation of 
efficiency of plea bargaining abroad 
Hurting Stalemate Prior bills dropped because of inter-agency deadlock 
External Shock International pressure; increased capacity of judges and 
prosecutors; unity in ENCCLA's action; SAL's efficiency in 
seeking consensus 
Source: Adapted from Weible and Sabatier (2006: 125) 
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6.2 The interplay between the anticorruption and public 
safety policy subsystems 
Weible (2008) states that policy subsystems can be of three different types. 
Unitary policy subsystems include one predominant coalition that exhibits 
“high intra-coalition belief compatibility and high intra-coalition coordination” 
(Weible 2008: 622). Collaborative policy subsystems are marked by coalitions 
that do cooperate, have to a certain extent compatible beliefs and are well 
coordinated in and among themselves. Finally, adversarial policy subsystems 
are formed by coalitions that compete and are in conflict among themselves, 
“with low inter-coalition belief compatibility and high intra-coalition and low 
inter-coalition coordination” (Weible 2008: 622). 
In the specific case of the COL, our analysis suggests that anticorruption 
and public safety initiatives in Brazil have to be examined in tandem, given the 
thematic proximity and frequent overlap among these two policy subsystems, 
as well as among the coalitions formed therein. 
A perfunctory analysis of their relationship might lead one to categorize 
them as collaborative efforts. The very definition of organized crime provided 
by the COL includes offenses ranging from corruption to drug-related gang 
violence. The organizations whose stances on the debates were analysed above 
have a jurisdictional umbrella that comprises both topics. As for individual 
actors, there are those who focus on public safety initiatives (such as Campos) 
and those who concentrate on anticorruption (such as Moro and the head of 
the Lava Jato taskforce, federal prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol), but also those 
dedicated to both topics (such as Vieira). Additionally, an overarching glance at 
the legislative process of the COL also points to the existence of cooperation 
(although often truncated by inter-agency disputes), coordination and belief 
compatibility. 
However, a more nuanced scrutiny shows that our case does not fit 
perfectly into Weible’s typology. This is mainly due to the inherent 
secretiveness of corrupt activities, as well as to the systemic nature of the 
corruption that affects the Brazilian Congress. Indeed, no account of the 
anticorruption policy process would be complete without reference to the 
resistance (and often covert opposition, if not sabotage) of influential political 
actors whose clandestine agenda is to protect the interests of those engaging in 
corruption. This influence changes policy negotiations, as well as the behaviour 
of the actors involved in it, in two main ways: 1) corrupt actors will attempt to 
steer outcomes according to their wishes, whether by infiltrating coalitions or 
by exerting external political pressure; and 2) benevolent actors may perceive a 
need to prevent their strategies from being revealed to malevolent ones, as 
seems to have been the case in the negotiations of the COL. 
The first of these changes brings an element of uncertainty to the analysis, 
as one cannot gather reliable data to properly assess the influence of corrupt 
actors – a limitation which particularly affects qualitative research. However, 
the second change can be best understood by contrasting the role of actors 
within the judiciary and the MPF before and after the Lava Jato. This is what 
we will do next. 
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6.3  The role of the main beneficiaries of the COL: strategy 
or opportunism? 
As exposed in chapter 5, there is enough evidence in the primary data to argue 
convincingly that the relatively smooth approval of the COL was only possible 
because lawmakers perceived it as devoted mainly to tackling violent organized 
crime. Even so, the advent of the Lava Jato allows the interpretation that 
certain actors within the policy subsystem were aware of the potential 
application of the law in corruption cases. Were these actors performing 
strategically from the beginning of the negotiations of the bill, or have they in 
fact acted opportunistically, taking advantage of the fortuitous approval of a 
law whose ample applicability had been underestimated by others? 
The judiciary and the MPF have arguably been the main beneficiaries of 
the COL. The law has facilitated convictions in corruption cases, thus causing 
the image of these organizations among the Brazilian population to be 
significantly improved. An evidence of this is the status of national hero 
acquired by federal judge Sérgio Moro, who was recently named the tenth most 
influential person in the world (Bloomberg 2016). 
 
 
            Judge               Sérgio                 Moro  
Photo: Angelo/Sigmapress/Folhapress (2015) 
 
Although interviewees have mentioned that Moro did participate in the 
crafting of the COL’s text, it is telling that none of them were able to specify 
the contents of his contribution. Certainly, the hearings about the bill that took 
place at the time were not highly-publicized events with his participation, as 
they are now that the Lava Jato has given these actors a significant platform to 
set the agenda around anticorruption policies. 
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Nevertheless, a careful analysis of Moro’s writings prior to the Lava Jato 
allows us to detect the existence of a strategic planning of the operation years 
before it came to be. In 2004, Moro published the article ‘Considerations on 
the Operation Mani Pulite’, about the causes for this major Italian 
anticorruption operation, noting the existence of “several institutional 
conditions required for a similar action in Brazil” (Moro 2004: 56). Comparing 
the claims made by Moro in this article with what ultimately occurred in the 
Lava Jato illustrates his astonishing foresight, ten years before the deflagration 
of the operation, as seen below. 
 
Institutional conditions for operations 
 
Moro (2004: 61) 
“In Brazil, many of the institutional conditions required for a similar 
judicial action are present. As in Italy, the political class does not enjoy a good 
reputation among the general population, and the frustration with the 
unfulfillment of the promises made after the re-establishment of democracy is 
large. Additionally, Brazilian judges and prosecutors enter their careers through 
public examinations, have tenure and cannot be relocated from their offices 
against their will. The negative side is the ample access to superior courts, 
which are more susceptible to political factors.” 
 
Lava Jato Operation (2014 onwards) 
As predicted by Moro, institutional traits of the Brazilian state allowed an 
operation of the magnitude of the Lava Jato. A negative view of politicians by 
the population (see chapter 1) granted political wherewithal to those 
conducting the operation. The constitutional protection of judges and 
prosecutors shielded the operation from political suffocation. Plea bargaining 
was the final ingredient of the equation, giving prosecutors access to 
information and indicating where and how to obtain evidence of the crimes. 
Moro’s experience also allowed him to detect that upper courts could be an 
obstacle to the operation. Indeed, one of the many controversies around the 
Lava Jato has been the issue of the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by 
Moro in Curitiba. Law professor Geraldo Prado, for instance, claims that "for a 
long time, the 13th district court [Moro's court] has no longer had jurisdiction to 
try cases which emerged remotely in the Banestado investigation. Under 
current rules, practically all procedures would either fall under the state justice 
jurisdiction or that of the federal justice in São Paulo, because these were the 
places where, allegedly, the gravest and the majority of infractions were 
committed" (Lopes and Segalia 2016). Regardless of whether or not these 
criticisms are correct from a legal standpoint, it is clear that the lower court in 
Curitiba, backed by the MPF, has fought to prevent criminal lawsuits from 
being declared out of its jurisdiction. 
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Delegitimation of the political system 
 
Moro (2004: 57-59) 
“The delegitimation of the political system was worsened by the start of 
the arrests and by the publicity of corruption cases. Simultaneously to making 
judicial action possible, this delegitimation was also fed by it.” 
“The prisons, confessions and the publicity granted to the information 
obtained generated a virtuous cycle, being the only explanation for the 
magnitude of the results obtained by the Mani Pulite.” 
 
Lava Jato Operation (2014 onwards) 
The highly-publicized arrests of prominent politicians in Brazil, even if on 
a merely preventive basis (that is to say, before their trials), has been a political 
novelty in the country. In prior corruption scandals, such as the Collor 
impeachment in 1992, no such arrests were made. The fact that Moro saw, as 
early as in 2004, these arrests as a tool to undermine the legitimacy of the 
political class lends credence to the interpretation that the Lava Jato has been 
using such type of arrests as a way to bolster its political strength, which is 
required for the operation to progress unencumbered. 
 
Political resistance to the investigation 
 
Moro (2004: 57) 
“It is naïve to think that effective criminal procedures against powerful 
figures, such as government authorities or businessmen, can be conducted 
normally, without reactions. An independent judiciary, both from external and 
internal pressure, is a necessary condition to support judicial actions of this 
type. However, the public opinion, as revealed by the Italian example, is also 
essential for the success of the judicial action.” 
 
Lava Jato Operation (2014 onwards) 
Much like in the Mani Pulite, the Lava Jato has been facing strong political 
resistance. This hails from actors who appear to have legitimate concerns for 
the legal limits which they claim have been crossed by the operation (see 
chapter 1), but also from those who are clandestinely attempting to interfere 
with the investigations. In a leaked phone conversation, for instance, a former 
Minister of Planning, Romero Jucá, suggested to a former president of 
Transpetro (a subsidiary of Petrobras), Sérgio Machado, that replacing 
president Rousseff by her then vice-president, Michel Temer, would allow the 
"bleeding" represented by the Lava Jato to be stopped, presumably because the 
new government would interfere politically in the PF. On October 2016, three 
members of Congress' security staff were arrested, for allegedly interfering with 
the investigations at the request of members of parliament. 
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Allegations that preventive arrests are used to coerce defendants into 
signing plea agreements 
 
Moro (2004: 58) 
“The investigative strategy followed from the beginning of the inquiry 
confronted suspects with the pressing decision of whether to confess, sowing 
suspicions that others had already talked and raising the prospect of spending 
at least a period of preventive custody in prison in case of remaining silent or, 
vice versa, being released immediately in case of a confession (a situation 
analogous to the archetypal (sic) of the famous 'prisoner's dilemma') (…). 
Isolation in prison was critical to prevent suspects from learning of the 
confessions of others” (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999: 268, as cited in Moro 
2004: 58). 
“There are those who may be against such strategy, and against plea 
bargaining itself. Here a few comments are necessary. One does not arrest with 
the intention of reaching confessions. One arrests when the requirements for 
determining a pre-trial arrest are present. In these cases, there is no moral 
obstacle to trying to obtain from the person under investigation or indicted a 
confession or plea bargain.” 
 
Lava Jato Operation (2014 onwards) 
The reference to the prisoner's dilemma shows that Moro was aware of 
the theoretical underpinnings that explain a suspect's decision to cooperate. 
The importance attributed to the isolation of defendants as a premise of the 
game reinforces the claim that arrests are being used to pressure them into 
signing plea agreements. One of the Lava Jato prosecutors, Manoel Pastana, 
even went so far as to claim, while giving his legal opinion in a habeas corpus 
filed by one of the defendants, that "the appropriateness of the arrest is 
manifest not only in the care taken to prevent the investigated from destroying 
evidence, but also in the possibility that isolation will influence his will to 
cooperate in the attribution of [criminal] responsibility, something that has 
proven to be quite fruitful recently." (Pastana 2014). Others, such as Dallagnol, 
have been careful to deny the misuse of preventive arrests: "It is clear that 
there is no cause and effect relationship between arrests and cooperation with 
the Lava Jato, because the alleged ‘cause’, namely, the arrest, was not present in 
over 70% of plea bargains, which were made with defendants in liberty. 
Linking arrests to cooperation, as critics have done, is a fallacy also because 
there are numerous cases in Brazil where preventive arrests have been 
maintained for months, without resulting in a decision by the defendant to 
cooperate" (Dallagnol 2015). As a rebuke, Mariz (2016, personal interview) has 
stated that "none of the plea bargains should be signed while the defendant is 
arrested" and that agreements obtained in this way should be "presumed to be 
untrue", given their element of psychological coercion. The bill proposed by 
Deputy Wadih Damous, which prohibits plea bargains from being signed by 
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defendants while in custody, follows the same rationale. Tellingly, such bill has 
been publicly criticized by Moro, who framed it as part of the political 
pushback to the operation: “I ask myself whether we are not seeing some signs 
of an attempt to return to the status quo of impunity for the powerful” (Moro 
2016). The judge also argued that plea bargaining is not merely an investigation 
tool, but also a defence prerogative available to those under trial, a line of 
reasoning repeatedly presented by supporters of the Lava Jato.  
 
The need for multiple sources of evidence 
 
Moro (2004: 58-59) 
“What is appropriate here is not the condemnation of the use of plea 
bargaining, but the adequate precautions required in obtaining the 
confirmation of the facts revealed by it, through independent sources of 
evidence.” 
 
Lava Jato Operation (2014 onwards) 
Moro was anticipating a debate that would emerge with the enactment of 
the COL. As mentioned in chapter 1, authors such as Pereira (2013) have 
highlighted the need for the evidence upon which a conviction is based to be 
external to the plea bargain. In other words, a suspect cannot be convicted 
simply because an informant has mentioned their name; the content of the 
informant’s contribution must be the means to achieve the production of 
further evidence of the crime. This view has been endorsed by the author of 
the COL (Slhessarenko 2016, personal interview), as well as by the Supreme 
Court minister Luiz Fachin, who stated that “a plea bargain is an indication for 
evidence, i.e., it corresponds to an indication that collaborates to the formation 
of a body of evidence. Therefore, it needs to be seconded by another evidence, 
which must be taintless, pertinent and decisive” (Fachin 2015). 
 
Use of the media and leaking information 
 
Moro (2004: 59) 
“Those responsible for the Mani Pulite have also made large use of the 
press. Indeed, 'much to the chagrin of the PSI leaders, who certainly never 
ceased to manipulate the press, the Mani Pulite investigation leaked like a 
broken faucet (...). The constant flow of revelations kept the public interested 
and the party leaders on the defensive.” (Gilbert 1995: 134-135, as cited in 
Moro 2004: 59) 
 
Lava Jato Operation (2014 onwards) 
The Lava Jato has been notorious for using the press to gain popular 
support. As discussed in chapter 1, the practice of leaking information to the 
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press has been a contentious issue. Moro's article suggests that this is an 
intentional and strategic component of the operation. Some have criticized 
what they perceive as a collusion between the Lava Jato and the media. Deputy 
Wadih Damous (2016, personal interview), for instance, has claimed that "what 
is being called 'the struggle against corruption' is in fact an instrument of the 
political game, operated by media conglomerates, sections of the judiciary and 
sections of the MPF." 
 
Political consequences of the scandal 
 
Moro (2004: 57-61) 
“The operation Mani Pulite has redrawn the political scenery in Italy. 
Parties that had dominated the Italian political life in the post-war period, such 
as the Socialist (PSI) and the Democratic Christian (DC), were brought to 
collapse, receiving, in the 1994 elections, only 2.2% and 11.1% of the votes, 
respectively.” 
“The isolated judicial action has only the effect of increasing the risks 
involved in the practice of corruption, putting into evidence the consequences 
of its detection. A very effective judicial action, as was the case, can at the most 
interrupt the ascending cycle of corruption. Nevertheless, it is not feasible to 
believe that it can, on its own, eliminate corruption, especially if its structural 
causes are not attacked.”  
“Maybe the most important lesson of the entire episode [the Mani Pulite] 
was that judicial action against corruption is only effective with the support of 
democracy. It is this that defines the limits and possibilities of judicial action. 
As long as it counts with the support of public opinion, it has the condition to 
advance and present good results. If this doesn't occur, it will likely not be 
successful.” 
 
Lava Jato Operation (2014 onwards) 
As discussed in chapter 1, the Lava Jato has had a tremendous impact in 
the political establishment in Brazil, even contributing to the impeachment of 
president Rousseff. In the municipal elections of 2016, the PT has seen its 
number of mayors fall from 644 to 256. Moro also shows an understanding of 
the limited impact that isolated judicial action, regardless of its magnitude, can 
have. This is, again, prescient, since many of the ensuing debates about tackling 
corruption have focused on changes to the criminal procedural code that can 
be seen as intending to interfere with what Moro called the “structural causes” 
of corruption, as we will see below. In the ACF, these structural elements are 
called ‘fundamental cultural values and social structure’. As seen in table 3 
above, in our case they consist of a struggle between accountability, 
transparency and the state's sanctioning power versus systemic corruption, 
clientelism and corporatism. The fact that Moro was referring to elements 
which in the ACF are considered relatively stable parameters is indicative of 
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the ambition of the reforms he expects to see in Brazil’s anticorruption 
framework. Indeed, according to Weible and Sabatier (2006: 125-126), these 
parameters are “important because they structure the nature of the problem 
(…) and broadly frame the values that inform policymaking”, but, given their 
“resistance to change, the relatively stable parameters are usually not 
strategically targeted by policy participants.” 
The analysis of Moro’s article suggests that he (and, presumably, others in 
the anticorruption policy subsystem) did act with long-term, strategic foresight. 
Nevertheless, Moro, as well as key actors in the MPF, had a much lower profile 
at the time of the negotiations, thus resulting in their limited (but not 
inexistent) capacity to contribute to the shaping of the COL’s text. This allows 
the conclusion that their actions were an amalgam of strategic planning with 
some exercises in agenda-setting; but, mostly, they have shown an insightful 
opportunism in the face of the serendipitous enactment of a highly effective 
legal instrument. 
Table 4 
Pre-Lava Jato 
Group Interest in the COL Capacity to influence Action taken 
Anticorruption policy 
subsystem 
Strongly in favor Low Quiet support based on 
technical expertise; 
'wait-and-see' attitude 
Public safety policy 
subsystem 
Strongly in favor High Active support 
Corrupt actors Disinterested Did not detect need to 
influence 
Absent 
Table 5 
Post-Lava Jato 
Group Interest in subsequent 
policies 
Capacity to influence Action taken 
Anticorruption policy 
subsystem 
Strongly in favor High Active support 
Public safety policy 
subsystem 
Strongly in favor, 
except for corrupt 
defectors 
High Active support, except 
for corrupt defectors 
Corrupt actors Strongly against High (covert influence) Clandestinely (but 
actively) working against 
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After the Lava Jato, however, the profile of the judiciary and the MPF 
grew tremendously, and actors within these organizations did not hesitate to 
upgrade the nature of their participation in policy-making activities, thus taking 
over a prominent role in setting the anticorruption agenda.  
The most evident example of this is the so-called ‘ten measures against 
corruption’, a bill crafted and advocated by the MPF and supported by Moro. 
It contains a complex set of new anticorruption norms, such as allowing 
preventive arrests to stop the evasion of funds acquired through corruption; 
the criminal punishment of political parties involved in corruption; the 
admissibility of illicit evidence obtained in good faith, among others. 
 
 
Prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol and TV Globo actress Maria Fernanda Cândido during event to 
promote the ‘ten measures against corruption’.  
 
Photo: Rosa/Agência Brasil (2016) 
 
With regards to our analytical framework, the most striking feature of the 
‘ten measures’ is the fact that they became a bill through a popular initiative 
proposal promoted by the MPF. In Brazil, the proposition of bills by popular 
initiative has stringent requirements: article 61, paragraph 2 of the Constitution 
states that “popular initiative can be exercised by the presentation to the 
Chamber of Deputies of a bill signed by at least one percent of the national 
electorate, distributed across at least five states, with no less than three percent 
of the voters in each of these states.” Even when campaigners do succeed in 
obtaining this enormous number of signatures, the bill then has to go through 
the normal legislative process in Congress, where it can be rejected. In 28 years 
since the enactment of the Constitution, only four popular initiatives bills have 
eventually become laws, none of which had been authored by the MPF. 
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In the case of the ‘ten measures’, over 2 million signatures have been 
collected across the country, and the proposals have officially become a bill 
(PLS 4850/2016) on March, 2016. The MPF cites over 1,000 entities as 
supporters of the proposal, among them “NGOs, universities, schools, 
religious entities, associations, private sector, public institutions, unions, artists, 
intellectuals and citizens” (MPF 2016c). 
This initiative is evidence that the MPs ‘political voluntarism’, identified by 
Arantes (2007), has not only seen a perplexing growth, but also an expansion 
in the types of activities the organization engages in. Whereas prior acts of 
voluntarism were circumscribed to the MP’s capacity to petition courts, mainly 
through public civil actions, now this agency ventures overtly into lawmaking 
territory. Before, its members were mostly restricted to acting on the levels of 
investigation and punishment for corruption, contributing in the formulation 
of specific policies mostly on a capacity of technical advisors, or as participants 
in turf wars aimed at increasing their agency’s procedural prerogatives (an 
activity which they have mastered since the Constitutional Assembly). Now, 
the agency has actually drafted a bill and through direct engagement with 
citizens is forcing Congress to vote on it. This is a testament to the political 
capital gained by the MPF, alongside the judiciary, with the Lava Jato. 
7   Conclusion 
The legislative process that led to the creation of a devastating blow to corrupt 
politicians in Brazil has in some ways been accidental. The overlap between the 
public safety and the anticorruption policy subsystems has meant that the 
epistemic community devoted to the former crafted an ingenious policy that 
ended up benefitting the latter. However, certain members of the advocacy 
coalition that succeeded in approving the bill seem to have been aware from 
the beginning of its potency in cases of corruption, as indicated by the 
presence in the Banestado CPI and in the ensuing debates of some of the same 
prosecutors and judges now active in the Lava Jato. If a “long-standing critique 
of the ACF is that shared beliefs are not enough to overcome the temptation 
to free ride on the efforts of other coalition members” (Weible and Sabatier 
2006: 132), then our findings indicate that something akin to ‘inter-subsystem 
free-riding’ is equally possible. In our case, actors within the public safety 
policy subsystem incurred the costs of forming a coalition around the bill, 
while the main beneficiaries have been actors in the anticorruption policy 
subsystem. 
This capture of plea bargaining is evidenced by the nature of the debates 
that shaped the text of the COL. The beliefs of the main political forces that 
participated in them have mostly played themselves out in the policy arena in 
the form of inter-agency turf wars, as there seemed to be no opposition to plea 
bargaining in itself. The aforementioned ‘free-riding’ behaviour has arguably 
resulted from constraints imposed by the nature of corrupt activities. Thus, 
rather than representing a lack of willingness to participate in collective action, 
the behaviour instead reveals a strategic decision to refrain from drawing 
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attention to the potential political consequences of plea bargaining. However, 
far from being frowned upon, the inspired opportunism of actors engaged in 
anticorruption initiatives was in fact welcomed by the members of the public 
safety epistemic community, as indicated by the primary data. This was to be 
expected, given the thematic overlap of the two subsystems. 
In any case, both the general public and the anticorruption epistemic 
community have entirely changed their perceptions of plea bargaining after the 
Lava Jato. A cycle of policy reformulation is under way, as evidenced by the 
multiple bills seeking to reform this instrument, which are a great cause for 
concern to many of those involved in the original debates, such as Vieira 
(2016, personal interview), who then acted as an essential policy broker. On 
the opposite direction, however, other correlated policies, such as the ‘ten 
measures’, are seeking to strengthen the changes brought about by plea 
bargaining. The heightened public attention given to the debate means that the 
locus of the policy arena has shifted from parliamentary commissions to the 
public sphere. 
Whether regressive or progressive in nature, all of these attempts of 
adaptation are legitimate policy choices and conform to the tenets of the ACF, 
which posits that change in policy processes “might include changes in beliefs 
through learning, changes in coalition members and their interconnections, and 
changes in policy. Policy change, for example, is hypothesized to occur 
through some combination of policy-oriented learning and belief change, 
negotiated agreements among members of rival coalitions, and exploitive 
activities of coalition members after major events, such as crises in conjunction 
with a coalition that exploits the opportunity” (Henry et al. 2014: 300). 
However, in addition to these two types of legitimate, policy-oriented 
learning processes, the astonishing initial success of plea bargains in corruption 
cases is also provoking behavioural changes in corrupt actors, a fast process of 
adaptation typical of surreptitious criminal activities8. Such covert manoeuvring 
poses serious difficulties for research, by rendering unfeasible the gathering of 
data aimed at revealing its policy consequences and effects on coalitions. This 
is yet another manifestation of the inherent obstacles of studies about 
corruption. Alas, it reinforces concerns about the applicability of the ACF in 
dysfunctional contexts, since the model does not seem to accommodate 
malevolent beliefs (in this case, propensity to corruption) as a clandestine 
element that affects policy formulation, a limitation particularly evident in 
contexts of systemic corruption. 
At any rate, the impact of the COL in debates about criminal law in Brazil 
cannot be overstated. Deep core beliefs can still be framed as a dichotomy: on 
the one hand, a zero tolerance stance against organized crime and corruption; 
on the other, the defence of garantismo penal, i.e., prioritizing respect for 
fundamental rights. However, the effect of the Lava Jato on political interests 
8 The newspaper Zero Hora, for instance, published a story detailing how the Lava Jato 
wiretaps have changed the culture of confidential conversations in Brasília, causing 
politicians to go to extreme lengths to maintain the secrecy of their dealings (Schaffner 
2016). 
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and on the attention of public opinion has brought indelible qualitative 
changes to how actors manifest such beliefs. According to Pereira (2016, 
personal interview), “these debates in Congress will be divided in before and after 
the Lava Jato operation.” Before, there was a minority defending fundamental 
rights and civil liberties, versus a majority, particularly hailing from police 
careers, energetically seeking more forceful punishments. The Lava Jato, 
however, has introduced a new component to this debate, since for the first 
time repeated arrests have been made in the upper echelons of Brazil’s 
business class. From this moment onwards, aspects of the Brazilian criminal 
justice system that were perceived by human rights activists as violations of 
fundamental rights (such as arbitrary arrests, gathering and usage of illegal 
evidence, incarceration of non-violent criminals, etc.) have started to affect not 
merely the impoverished, disenfranchised population of the country, but also 
those who have access to private legal counselling and who engage in lobbying 
activities. 
The spectacular repercussions of the Lava Jato operation and of President 
Rousseff’s impeachment will surely mean that the next iterations of the 
anticorruption policy cycle will be fiercely contested. In the upcoming stages of 
this cycle, new actors and interest groups will not fail to recognize plea 
bargaining specifically as an anticorruption tool, adjusting their lobbying 
activities, reassessing existing coalitions and exerting their political clout 
accordingly. The decade-long policy change cycle described by the ACF will 
continue to provide a fertile analytical tool for understanding such evolution, 
but the inherently secretive and ever-adaptive nature of corruption will remain 
a perennial difficulty for research. 
As a summary of our findings, and in reference to the research sub-
questions, we can state the following: 
 During the negotiations of the COL, those who would later become its 
main beneficiaries (the judiciary and the MPF) have acted with strategic 
foresight, but this was constrained by their limited capacity to interfere in 
policy formulation. Later, their insightful opportunism in employing plea 
bargaining has given them a much more prominent standing from which 
to affect the next iterations of the policy cycle.  
 The controversies and points of conflict between the actors during the 
legislative process mostly consisted of inter-agency battles to increase the 
procedural roles of the main organizations involved in enforcing the COL 
(the judiciary, the MP and police commissioners). No vocal opposition to 
plea bargaining as such was observed in the legislative process. 
  The deep core beliefs of the actors involved in the bill can be summarized 
by the dichotomy between those who defend a zero tolerance policy 
against organized crime and corruption and those who seek to ensure 
respect for fundamental rights. Their policy core beliefs take the form of 
corporatist competition for an increased role of agencies in criminal 
procedures. Finally, their secondary beliefs were expressed as a practically 
unanimous understanding that plea bargaining is an efficient procedural 
instrument to fight organized crime. 
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 The political and social forces which allowed plea bargaining to be 
introduced in Brazilian legislation have been presented in table 2 above. A 
particularly prominent actor was SAL. Despite its forceful stance as a 
watchdog for fundamental rights, its political clout was yielded to 
overcome corporatist disputes that tend to paralyze such processes. 
Additionally, ENCCLA was invaluable in forming consensus around the 
bill and ensuring its approval in Congress. 
Finally, with regards to the main research question, our findings indicate 
that Brazilian lawmakers approved plea bargaining because debates in Congress 
caused them to perceive this instrument as being mainly devoted to tackling 
violent organized crime. The overlap between the anticorruption and the 
public safety policy subsystems prevented corrupt lawmakers from realizing 
the potential implications of plea bargaining in corruption cases, allowing the 
public safety coalition to lend its support to the bill unencumbered. 
This research contributes to the literature on anticorruption policies in 
Brazil by showing how institutional tweaks can be implemented despite 
recalcitrance in the policy arena, whether from actors whose corporatist 
interests lead to policy deadlock, or from those whose corrupt inclinations lead 
to a covert antagonism towards effective anticorruption initiatives. 
Additionally, the research joins a significant body of literature that describes 
the overarching framework set up to fight corruption in Brazil, but with the 
original contribution of presenting a critical interpretation of the interplay of 
political forces involved in the early stages of policy formulation. In doing so, 
this work adds specific empirical elements to a modern institutional approach 
employed to study corruption, which is an offspring of classical theoretical 
oeuvres about the formative vices of Brazilian society. 
Outside the scope of area studies, the research provides a practical 
application of the ACF in a politically unstable environment marked by 
systemic corruption. The flawless applicability of the model in such contexts 
remains doubtful, but this is a question that certainly deserves further scrutiny 
by additional research. 
Promising areas for future research include analysing how discourses 
about corruption and about criminal law have shifted among lawmakers since 
the Lava Jato. In particular, the role of the media as a tool to stoke popular 
opinion about corruption cases could be the object of further comparative 
research. Additionally, since a constant point of contention is the alleged use of 
preventive arrests to coerce defendants into signing plea bargains, testing 
whether being temporarily incarcerated makes one prone to engage in these 
negotiations could be revelatory. Also, it is relevant to further assess the 
reasons for civil society’s feeble presence in debates about criminal procedures. 
Finally, Soltes’ (2016) investigation of the motivations for the behaviour of 
white-collar criminals, in which he did have access to and conducted extensive 
interviews with convicts such as Bernie Madoff, shows that it is in fact possible 
to produce qualitative data that illuminates a phenomenon as secretive as 
corruption; replicating his approach in systemically corrupt contexts could 
prove prolific. 
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Appendix: list of  interviewees 
Name Position Role in the PLS 150/06 
Serys Slhessarenko Former member of the PT; a senator 
from the state of Mato Grosso between 
2003 and 2011 
Author of the bill 
Antero Paes de 
Barros 
Former member of the PSDB; a 
senator  from the state of Mato Grosso 
between 1999 and 2007 
One of the leading parliamentarians in 
favor of the bill, due to his prior role as 
the President of the Banestado CPI 
Carlos Vieira da 
Cunha 
Member of the PDT; a deputy (member 
of the lower house of Congress) 
between 2007 and 2011; a career 
federal prosecutor from the MPF 
Rapporteur of the bill at the lower 
house’s CCJ 
Marivaldo Pereira Former Secretary of Legal Affairs of the 
Ministry of Justice. 
SAL was one of the most important 
bodies to seek consensus around the 
bill 
Tiago Ivo Odon Career member of the Senate’s 
technical staff 
Took part in the writing of the bill and 
in its subsequent negotiations and 
procedural matters. 
Salise Sanchonete Upper court judge in the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul 
President of the ENCCLA 
César Bechara Career federal prosecutor from the 
MPF 
President of the CONAMP, the body 
that acted as the MPF’s representative 
during the public hearings about the 
bill 
Josmar Verillo Director of AMARRIBO, one of the 
leading anticorruption NGOs in Brazil  
Since civil society did not play a 
significant role in the approval of the 
COL, the reasons for this absence 
merited investigation 
Antônio Cláudio 
Mariz de Oliveira 
Criminal defense lawyer Active critic of procedures deemed 
“excessive” during the negotiations of 
plea bargains 
Alexandre Buck 
Sampaio 
Federal judge in Minas Gerais Responsible for the first sentences 
issued in the Mensalão scandal 
(2005). 
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